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We surveyed all 336 OONI Run v2 links, and three of them drive 72% of all measurements

Toomore Chiang — Mon, 01 Jun 2026 20:40:03 +0000

We surveyed all 336 OONI Run v2 links, and three of them drive 72% of all measurements¶

Worldwide, OONI Run v2 has produced 14.17 million measurements, and just three lists account for 72% of them. The highest-volume lists all work the same way: each one targets a single censorship or blocking phenomenon, and a continuously-running measurement backend executes it on a schedule, accumulating data over time. We surveyed every Run v2 link to measure how concentrated this is, and to draw out what the pattern offers communities that want to run their own local connectivity observation.

OONI (the Open Observatory of Network Interference) is a global censorship-measurement project. Its mobile app, OONI Probe, runs through a list of websites and reports whether each one is reachable from where you are. OONI Run v2 lets anyone compose their own list of sites to watch, generate a link, and have others run that list with one tap in OONI Probe, with every result flowing into OONI's public dataset. You can define your own measurement targets without writing code, yet few people know the feature exists or have used it, which is exactly why we wanted to see how it is actually used.

What we did¶

We took a snapshot on 2026-06-01 and went through every live OONI Run v2 link, 336 of them, pulling each link's lifetime measurement count from OONI's public aggregation API¹ and grouping them by list topic. Every figure below is based on that snapshot; the data source and caveats are at the end.

How big is the population: 337 links in two years¶

From the first link on 2024-04-24 to now, about 26 months, the whole world has created only 337 Run v2 links (one has been deleted; 336 remain). Creation spiked between October and December 2024 and has since held steady at 10 to 19 per month. 157 distinct authors took part, and 332 of the 336 use Web Connectivity, almost all of them testing website reachability.

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For a global censorship-observation tool, 337 links in two years is a small number. Going by creation count alone, it is easy to conclude that almost nobody uses Run v2. The usage data in the next section overturns that.

Usage is extremely concentrated, Gini 0.981¶

Adding up the lifetime measurements of all 336 links gives 14,171,627. The total is not small; the problem is how unevenly it is distributed. The Gini coefficient by measurement count is 0.981, almost at the 1.0 of complete inequality.

Why the Gini coefficient

The Gini coefficient was originally used to measure income inequality. It ranges from 0 to 1 and compresses the concentration of a whole distribution into a single number. 0 means perfectly even, with every link producing the same number of measurements. 1 means fully concentrated, with all measurements coming from a single link.

It fits here well, because each link's measurement count is a non-negative quantity and the question is exactly how concentrated all measurements are among a few links. Mathematically the Gini coefficient equals the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal (divided by the total area below the diagonal), so the closer the Lorenz curve below hugs the bottom edge, the closer the Gini coefficient is to 1. A value of 0.981 means the distribution is very close to the extreme where a handful of links take almost everything.

A single number does not show which links these are or what the long tail looks like, so we include both the Lorenz curve and a bucketed distribution to lay out the shape of the concentration.

Lorenz curve of measurement volume (the dashed line is perfect equality) {"description":"Lorenz curve of measurement volume across Run v2 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The Lorenz curve runs almost flat along the bottom and only shoots up at the very end. The 90% of links with the fewest measurements add up to just 0.93% of the total, and even the bottom 99% account for only 20.45%. The top 4 links take about 79.5%, and the single largest (DW's Global media, id 10006) is 46.5% on its own.

Which bucket each link's lifetime measurement count falls into {"description":"Distribution of lifetime measurement counts per link","data":{"values":[{"bucket":"= 0","links":112,"share":0.0,"order":0},{"bucket":"1–99","links":81,"share":0.0,"order":1},{"bucket":"100–999","links":73,"share":0.2,"order":2},{"bucket":"1k–9999","links":41,"share":1.0,"order":3},{"bucket":"10k–99k","links":15,"share":2.4,"order":4},{"bucket":"100k–999k","links":12,"share":28.0,"order":5},{"bucket":"1M+","links":2,"share":68.3,"order":6}]},"mark":{"type":"bar","tooltip":true,"color":"#0089bf"},"encoding":{"x":{"field":"bucket","type":"ordinal","sort":{"field":"order"},"title":"Lifetime measurements (bucket)","axis":{"labelAngle":-30}},"y":{"field":"links","type":"quantitative","title":"Links"},"tooltip":[{"field":"bucket","title":"Bucket"},{"field":"links","title":"Links"},{"field":"share","title":"% of all measurements"}]}}

At the other end of the tail, 112 of the 336 links (33%) have zero lifetime measurements, built and then barely run. 193 (57%) have fewer than 100, and the overall median is just 27. Most Run v2 links get created, run a few times, and stop.

Where the measurements concentrate¶

The concentration above only describes the shape of the distribution, not what the data is actually used for. Once the links are grouped by list topic, the most heavily-observed cohorts show a common way of working.

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Deutsche Welle (DW) uses 3 lists to continuously monitor the reachability of international media across many places, taking 72.4%. Spain's conexionsegura uses 13 lists to watch the piracy blocks ordered by the LaLiga football league, at 10.8%. Venezuela's vesinfiltro uses 4 lists to track local blocking, at 6.5%. Add Uruguay's UCU research team and an observer who has long tested Thai government websites. The most heavily-observed cohorts share a clear common thread: each list targets one specific censorship or blocking phenomenon, paired with a continuously-running measurement backend that watches it day after day. That is the underestimated way to use it.

Listing the top 15 links by measurement count makes the same pattern concrete.

link id	Lifetime measurements	List size	Created	Author	List name
`10006`	6,589,070	223	2024-07-03	dw.com	Global media
`10005`	3,093,765	91	2024-06-13	dw.com	Selected (inter)national media
`10236`	856,036	167	2026-05-14	conexionsegura	La Liga bloqueos.es
`10158`	734,627	4635	2025-04-03	ucu (UY)	lista global final
`10004`	582,480	15	2024-12-11	dw.com	Trusted International Media
`10154`	418,978	131	2025-03-26	vesinfiltro	MagisTV y FlujoTV
`10135`	344,268	819	2025-04-16	conexionsegura	Test Bloqueos LaLiga
`10153`	259,331	102	2025-03-24	vesinfiltro	PriorityList
`10143`	210,078	134	2025-03-05	vesinfiltro	VSF News y otros
`10298`	133,991	72	2026-05-04	Thailand observer	Test Thai gov websites
`10226`	118,509	170	2025-09-15	conexionsegura	Bloqueos LaLiga - Dominios
`10235`	109,276	293	2025-09-20	conexionsegura	VE media http+https check
`10214`	105,439	67	2025-10-04	Thailand observer	Test Thai gov websites
`10114`	102,096	256	2026-05-05	jiyul.org	revi
`10118`	56,541	3044	2025-03-26	ucu (UY)	LISTA GLOBAL

Long-term observation comes from a continuously-running backend, list size barely matters¶

An intuitive guess is that the more sites a list collects, the more data it produces. The data does not support that guess. Plotting each link's list size (number of inputs) against its lifetime measurements shows almost no relationship.

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The two extremes are clearest. UCU's id 10158 packed in 4,635 inputs (the largest on the network) for 734,627 lifetime measurements. DW's id 10004 has only 15 inputs yet 582,480. No matter how big a list gets, without a continuously-running backend to execute it the measurement count stays near 0, which means no observation is happening. What actually lets observation accumulate is whether there is a measurement infrastructure that runs the list every day; how many sites it collects matters far less.

anoni.net's own coordinates: the community is its own controlled experiment¶

The anoni.net community has built two Run v2 links, which happen to demonstrate the two patterns above. We lay both out, not just the better-performing one.

The first, id 10238, was built on 2025-09-15 with 7 inputs (anoni.net plus our own services: im, matrix, form, pad, search, cinny) and has run only 14 measurements in its lifetime. It sits with the majority: built but not run continuously. The second, id 10328, was built on 2026-05-15, expanded to 10 inputs, and this time paired with a self-operated vantage point that runs continuously. In half a month it accumulated 4,659 measurements, ranking 39th of 336, inside the top 12%.

Same community, same draft list of anoni.net's own services; the only difference between the two links is whether a continuously-running backend stands behind it. We do not dodge the other side either: 10328's share of the whole network is still near 0%. In such a long-tailed distribution, just running continuously for half a month already beats 297 links, which shows how many people miss the "run it continuously" threshold. The move from 10238 to 10328 is the record of the community crossing that threshold itself.

What it means for communities and OONI¶

For communities that want to run local connectivity observation, the census points in a clear direction. Run v2's value comes from a curated list aimed at a specific phenomenon plus a continuously-running measurement backend; missing either one drops you into the long tail. Opening more links by itself brings no data.

The same pattern applies to many topics. The DW, conexionsegura, and vesinfiltro cases above are three already-running examples: international media reachability, sports-piracy blocking, and local blocking. If you want to start, here are a few directions to consider.

Election observation: from before to after an election, continuously track the reachability of news media, candidate, and election-authority websites in a given region, recording any blocking or interference during the voting period, giving election observers and researchers an evidentiary time series.
Real-time observation of major events: during protests, strikes, disasters, or shutdowns, continuously test independent media, messaging services (Signal, Telegram), and help-and-information sites, to see in real time which are blocked and when.
Specific communities and issues: sites that are often blocked in some regions, such as LGBTQ+, religious minorities, women's rights, and human-rights organizations, observed longitudinally to accumulate evidence that research can cite.
Circumvention-tool availability: track the official sites and download endpoints of VPNs, Tor, bridges, and other circumvention tools, whether they are still reachable in a given place and when blocking begins, which is especially useful for groups helping local people stay connected.
Cross-border media and diaspora communities: the overseas media that diaspora communities rely on (for Chinese-language readers, for example RFA or Initium Media), observed for reachability differences across ASNs and changes over time.
Platform-level blocking events: when an app or service is suddenly blocked in a country, quickly build a list and observe across ASNs, measuring the scope and the start and end times of the block, turning a single event into analyzable data.

Pick a topic you care about most, list a dozen or so relevant sites, and have one vantage point run it every day; within a few weeks you will have your own reachability time series to analyze. For OONI and data-analysis partners: the aggregation API supports filtering by ooni_run_link_id, which makes a meta-analysis of the Run v2 ecosystem itself feasible. This report was produced exactly that way. The anoni.net community has written up this approach as a measurement-model proposal in issue #78; the call for feedback is still open, and we welcome discussion from the community and the OONI team.

Summary of the issue #78 measurement model

Issue #78 proposes a civic-internet-watch measurement model that splits the system into two layers.

List governance: the community maintains its own list of civil-society websites, with the single source of truth in the community's git repo. Inclusion criteria, consultation status, and sensitivity tiers are all decided by the community according to local context, and the git history is itself the record of list governance.
Measurement and data: using the standard Web Connectivity test, a Run v2 link generated from the list does the measuring. Volunteer phones and self-operated vantage points consume the same link and carry the same Run Link ID, and all results flow into OONI's public dataset, queryable via the OONI API and Explorer, citable by researchers, with no data lock-in.

List governance does not churn the shared Citizen Lab tw.csv, avoiding the breaks in long-term measurement time series that repeated edits to a shared list would cause. tw.csv is demoted from a required path to optional, additive feedback: only mature, non-sensitive organizations are fed back additively in exchange for the cross-platform baseline, while sensitive organizations stay in the community-managed list and Run v2 and never enter a public PR.

Data and caveats¶

This report's data is a snapshot taken on 2026-06-01, pulled link by link from OONI's public aggregation API¹ (filtered by ooni_run_link_id). Measurement counts keep growing over time, so re-querying later yields slightly higher numbers, while the shape of the concentration stays stable. A few caveats before reading the figures.

Measurement counts come from the aggregation API's measurement_count, a point-in-time query as of 2026-06-01 that keeps growing.
The lifetime query spans 2024-01-01 to 2026-06-30, covering the whole history of Run v2.
A link with 0 measurements may be a test or draft, and does not necessarily mean "failure".
A link can be run by probes in any country; the use-case cohorts are inferred from list topic, not an official OONI label.
Full disclosure: the community's own two links (10238, 10328) are both included in the analysis and discussion; we did not cherry-pick the better-performing 10328.

OONI API (aggregation endpoint) - OONI ↩↩

How Unredacted Helps People in Censored Regions Reach the Open Internet

Toomore Chiang — Mon, 01 Jun 2026 15:51:34 +0000

How Unredacted Helps People in Censored Regions Reach the Open Internet¶

This post is based on a guest post on the Tor Blog by Unredacted, with an anoni.net community perspective added for Taiwan and the wider Sinophone region.

Keeping the doors open, Tor Blog, by Unredacted.org, 2026-05-15

Unredacted is a US-based 501(c)(3) non-profit that runs a network of 300+ servers to keep people in heavily censored places connected to the open internet. Their guest post is part of the Tor Blog's spotlight series on organizations defending the free internet, and it opens with a line from a user in China: "You have helped many many people to overcome the great firewall." That kind of message is rare, because people living under censorship usually have no safe channel to send one.

This post highlights what Unredacted builds, and what it looks like from where the anoni.net community sits, in Taiwan.

What Unredacted runs¶

Unredacted Door is their umbrella for circumvention services: FreeSocks proxies, messaging proxies for Signal and Telegram, Tor bridges, and Snowflake. Over a recent 30-day window these carried nearly 300 TiB for tens of thousands of people routing around censorship. The largest piece, FreeSocks, is built to look unremarkable on the wire, the opposite of a standard VPN that advertises itself through a known endpoint and handshake. FreeSocks v2 leans on Xray to make proxy traffic resemble ordinary HTTPS, paired with an open-source control plane that rotates endpoints automatically when a server gets blocked.

What is Xray

Xray is a traffic-routing and obfuscation tool descended from the V2Ray project, widely used in heavily censored places like China and Iran. Protocols such as VLESS, Trojan, and Reality disguise proxy traffic as ordinary HTTPS / TLS, smoothing over the handshake and packet shapes a VPN gives away at a glance. See the Xray-core project.

GreenWare is their effort to run real relay capacity on low-power hardware. Instead of datacenter servers that draw power like a space heater, they run Tor exits on PoE-powered Raspberry Pi 5 boards and a 1U chassis of 20 ComputeBlade modules. As of their writing, all 123 of their Tor exit relays run on this combined setup, drawing roughly 400W in total, about what a few old incandescent bulbs burn. Lower cost and power per exit means more people can take on the hardest, most legally exposed part of running Tor.

From the anoni.net community: a Taiwan vantage point¶

anoni.net is an anonymity-network community based in Taiwan, and that is the vantage point these notes are written from. Taiwan's network environment is relatively free: no Great Firewall, no mandatory VPN registration, no state censorship orders to ISPs. That is exactly why a place like Taiwan, with free outbound connectivity, is well positioned to host Tor relays and bridges and carry a share of the circumvention work. The people this infrastructure serves are in heavily censored places like mainland China and Iran. Other regions with equally free connectivity, like Singapore, Malaysia, and wherever the diaspora lives, are just as suitable as hosting locations.

The anoni.net community tracks the number and distribution of Tor relays in Taiwan through Pulse live monitoring. As of 2026-05-31, Onionoo (the Tor Project's relay data service) sees 12 running relays inside Taiwan, of which only 3 carry the Exit flag (initramfs, GuruKopi, jerryrelay). Set against Unredacted, a single organization running 123 exit relays and carrying nearly 300 TiB over 30 days, Taiwan's nationwide exit capacity is under 3% of theirs. We keep this number current on the Tor Relays watch page and pair it with OONI's censorship observations for Taiwan and nearby regions.

For the Sinophone world, demand for circumvention has grown since 2020 across Hong Kong, Macau, and Mandarin-speaking communities in Southeast Asia, while circumvention resources written in Chinese remain comparatively scarce. Part of anoni.net's work is filling that gap with Chinese-language documentation, walking the same path as Unredacted Education.

From the anoni.net community: GreenWare's feasibility for free-connectivity regions¶

Unredacted running 123 exit relays on 400W makes for friendly operating economics. At a typical Taiwan commercial electricity rate of roughly NT$3.5–6 per kWh (about US$0.11–0.19), 400W running year-round is about 3,500 kWh, or roughly NT$12,000–21,000 a year (about US$400–700).¹ That is an affordable line item for a campus IT center or a community workspace. Readers elsewhere can convert their local rate; the order of magnitude usually lands in the same range.

The key is designing the hardware to scale. Raspberry Pi 5 is familiar to maker communities everywhere, and PoE+ HATs and PoE switches are easy to buy through ordinary electronics retail. ComputeBlade (the 20-module 1U chassis) has fewer retail channels and is usually obtained through official overseas ordering or a community group buy. An institutional server room suits this better than a home network, for three reasons: a static IP, institutional bandwidth, and someone on site to check the machines.

Campus Tor relays are one of anoni.net's three focus areas for 2026, and the community is collecting field experience into a setup playbook (Campus Tor Relay research track, a zh-TW page with the English version pending, plus the writeup Setting up a Tor relay at NTNU). Unredacted's engineering approach with GreenWare is a useful reference point for the next school weighing a deployment: start with a single PoE-powered Raspberry Pi 5 middle relay, and once it runs stably, consider exits and chassis density.

For an individual or a small group, running a Snowflake proxy (a browser extension or Docker) carries almost no electricity cost and is the lowest-barrier entry into circumvention infrastructure (see Snowflake).

What you can do¶

If Unredacted's work makes you want to help people in censored regions reach the open internet, here are a few entry points:

Learn about Unredacted: visit unredacted.org for their services and transparency information, then decide whether to support their servers, bandwidth, and staffing through their official channels.
Run Snowflake: the lowest-barrier contribution, run from a browser extension or Docker (see Snowflake).
Run a Tor relay or bridge: this needs a steady network and a little operational effort. The Tor Project's relay guide walks through the setup, and the community wrote up how to set up a Tor WebTunnel bridge.
Campus Tor relays: if you work or study at a college or university, start your assessment from the Campus Tor Relay research track (zh-TW page, English version pending).
Join the anoni.net community discussion: trade notes with other members over Matrix; the entry point is on the community page, and other contact channels are on the contact page.

Taiwan's 2026 average electricity rate is NT$3.7823 per kWh (frozen for April–September by the 2026-03-27 rate review); the actual per-kWh price varies by customer class and time-of-use tier. Source: Taipower electricity rate schedule. ↩

After Iran's 80-day blackout, traffic surged through our community's Tor WebTunnel bridge

Toomore Chiang — Thu, 28 May 2026 23:15:02 +0000

After Iran's 80-day blackout, traffic surged through our community's Tor WebTunnel bridge¶

For people in Iran, the outside internet barely existed for nearly three months. When connectivity started to come back a few days ago, the Tor WebTunnel bridge our community runs began taking on a wave of traffic. That was Iranians who had found a way around the censorship and reconnected to Tor, getting back onto the wider internet.

Wherever you are, you can help

If you have a VPS (a small cloud server) or a physical machine, plus a domain name, you can run a Tor WebTunnel bridge and give people cut off by censorship a way back onto the open internet. Can't run a server? Open a browser tab and run Snowflake instead, it contributes anonymous traffic just the same.

Server specs, legal considerations, and the full setup steps are written up in How to set up a Tor WebTunnel bridge.

More than 80 days offline¶

Starting 28 February 2026, Iran cut its outbound connectivity during military operations. This was the whole country's link to the outside world going dark, close to nationwide, a different order of magnitude from the usual censorship that blocks individual sites. According to Cloudflare Radar, Iran's outbound traffic dropped to around 0.3% of its normal peak after the shutdown, effectively zero, and stayed pinned at that low through March and April¹². It was not until around 26 May that traffic shot back up toward normal levels. From shutdown to reopening, more than 80 days.

Iran's outbound internet traffic as observed by Cloudflare Radar. It fell to near zero after the 28 February 2026 shutdown, held at that low through March and April, and shot back up around 26 May.

During the blackout, Iran was left with only a heavily filtered domestic network. Local services like banking and food delivery kept running, but connections to the outside were almost entirely severed. NetBlocks recorded it as one of the longest nationwide shutdowns in modern history; of the country's 90 million people, most went nearly three months with little or no access to the global internet³.

Traffic jumped once Iran reopened¶

The Tor WebTunnel bridge our community runs sits in the background, helping people who cannot reach Tor get around censorship and connect. In the two days after Iran reopened, connections through that node jumped noticeably, with traffic well above its usual level. Seeing the traffic return was a relief, because it meant people were getting back online.

Traffic through the community-run Tor WebTunnel bridge. Connections jumped clearly once Iran reopened.

During the blackout, people there couldn't even reach Tor, because the entire outbound link was down. Once connectivity returned, many rushed to find out what had happened while they were cut off and to reconnect with family they had lost touch with. Journalists needed to get local news out, civil-society groups needed to coordinate with the outside, and all of that means reaching sites and services that have long been blocked. Getting around the censorship usually means Tor, and where Tor itself is blocked, it means bridges run by volunteers around the world. When people connected to Tor through a bridge, some of those connections came through the node our community hosts (the community also runs a node in Singapore, which didn't receive traffic this time).

Looking at the source networks behind the connections to this bridge, the top five are all major Iranian carriers, confirming the traffic really is coming from ordinary users on the ground there.

Source ASNs for connections to the WebTunnel bridge (Cloudflare dashboard). The top five are all major Iranian carriers: Mobile Communication Company of Iran (MCI), Iran Telecommunication Company (TCI), Irancell, Aria Shatel, and Pasargad, confirming the traffic comes from users inside Iran.

The traffic didn't fade after those first two days. Connections have kept coming through this bridge since. According to monitors like NetBlocks, Iran's recovery is incomplete: mobile networks were still down for a stretch while home Wi-Fi came back first, blocks on major social platforms remain in place, and in some cases are tighter than before the shutdown, so reaching ordinary sites abroad often still requires tools like a VPN³⁴. For many people, even with the internet "reopened," reaching the outside still means routing around a lot of blocking, and our WebTunnel bridge is one of those ways around.

With traffic still flowing through it day after day, a handful of bridges is clearly not enough. So we'd like to invite more people who are able to run bridges, in more places, so that more people who need to reach the outside can get through.

Need a connection? Write to us

The community currently runs one Tor WebTunnel bridge each in Taiwan and Singapore. To keep censors from simply blocking the addresses, these bridge lines aren't posted publicly. If you or someone you know needs one, you're welcome to email whisper@anoni.net to request it (other ways to reach us are on the contact page).

Why WebTunnel¶

WebTunnel wraps Tor traffic inside an ordinary HTTPS connection, so to a censor it looks like normal web browsing (illustration).

Tor has several kinds of bridges, and they differ in how hard they are for a censor to block.

Snowflake has the lowest barrier: open a browser tab and you're helping people connect, no server required, anyone can start in seconds, and it's useful in most censored places. It runs over WebRTC (the real-time connection technology browsers use for video calls), and that traffic doesn't quite look like normal web browsing, so in the most aggressively filtered environments it can be easier to spot. Another bridge type, obfs4, turns the traffic into a blob of patternless noise, but censorship systems using deep packet inspection (DPI, which analyzes connections one by one to decide what to allow) can still flag it as not-normal browsing and drop it.

WebTunnel takes a different approach: it wraps Tor traffic inside a genuine HTTPS connection (the kind with the padlock and the https prefix in your browser's address bar). To a censor, connecting to a WebTunnel bridge looks no different from visiting an ordinary website. To block it, they'd have to block large numbers of legitimate HTTPS sites along with it, a cost that censors usually won't pay. That makes WebTunnel one of the strongest bridges against this kind of filtering, and it's already in real use in China and Russia.

Iran's case this time was more extreme: the entire outbound link was severed, and during a full blackout no bridge can function at all. Bridges only become useful again once connectivity returns and the country is back to its everyday filtering. Iran's filtering is also trickier than China's or Russia's, since it uses a protocol allowlist that only lets specific kinds of connections through, and WebTunnel wasn't easy to run there at first⁵.

As Tor moved to distributing bridges over Telegram and volunteers grew the number of nodes, from 2025 onward Tor has observed more and more Iranian users successfully reaching Tor over WebTunnel⁶, which lines up with what our community node saw after the reopening. Over the same period, Snowflake has been especially useful in Iran, with Tor describing it as one of the best connection tools available there⁷. For internet freedom in Iran, both WebTunnel and Snowflake are working routes, and both welcome more people to join in.

Run one from your region¶

Anywhere with free, well-connected outbound access is a good place to host a bridge. Censors keep blocking the bridge IPs they already know about, so the more WebTunnel bridges there are spread across different countries and different network providers, the more entry points people on the ground can use. Every additional node, in one more country, is one more way in that hasn't been blocked yet.

The barrier really isn't high:

A small VPS with 512MB to 1GB of memory is enough to run one, with lower cost and less upkeep than a Tor relay.
You need a domain (or subdomain) and a TLS certificate (the certificate that lets a site use a secure https connection), which you can get for free from Let's Encrypt.
The legal risk is low. A bridge is only a relay point; it never connects directly to the website a user ultimately visits. The destination site sees an exit from the Tor network, not your server, which makes it far safer than running a Tor exit node.

We've written up the whole process, from preparing a domain and getting a certificate to standing the bridge up, plus the firewall, cover page, monitoring, and ongoing operations:

How to set up a Tor WebTunnel bridge

If running a WebTunnel bridge isn't an option for you, you can still open a browser and run Snowflake: leave the tab open and it contributes anonymous traffic, helping people who can't reach Tor get around censorship. When you're ready to commit a server, come back and set up a WebTunnel.

Not just Iran¶

Iran's shutdown was extreme, but censorship and shutdowns aren't a distant exception. Myanmar, Belarus, and China sustain heavy filtering year-round⁸⁹¹⁰, and every regional conflict, election, or protest tends to come with a tightening of the network. Hong Kong has gone from a fairly open internet to seeing national-security-law site blocking in recent years¹¹. Earthquakes and undersea-cable cuts can disrupt a region's outbound connectivity too¹². Helping people elsewhere get around censorship today is also how a community builds the experience of running and maintaining anonymity infrastructure for when it's needed closer to home.

One node doesn't change much, but many nodes spread across the world add up to a network a censor can't pull down all at once. If you have a spare VPS or physical machine, a domain, and a little time, we'd love for you to help stand up more bridges, wherever you are.

Community discussion happens on Matrix (home server im.anoni.net); how to join and other ways to reach us are on that page.

Cloudflare Radar — Iran - Cloudflare Radar ↩
Internet shutdown in Iran amid military actions - Cloudflare Radar ↩
Internet restored to tens of millions in Iran after three-month blackout - The National ↩↩
Iran's Internet restored for some after 88 days of blackout - UPI ↩
Hiding in plain sight: Introducing WebTunnel - The Tor Project ↩
Staying ahead of censors in 2025: What we've learned from fighting censorship in Iran and Russia - The Tor Project ↩
How Iranians are overcoming unprecedented internet censorship - TechRadar ↩
Update: internet access, censorship, and the Myanmar coup - Access Now ↩
Internet disruption hits Belarus on election day - NetBlocks ↩
China: Freedom on the Net 2025 Country Report - Freedom House ↩
Hong Kong Website Blocked, Sparking Fears Over Great Firewall - Radio Free Asia ↩
After Chinese Vessels Cut Matsu Internet Cables, Taiwan Seeks to Improve Its Communications Resilience - The Diplomat ↩

Campus Tor Relay templates: proposal, SOP, and FAQ now published

Toomore Chiang — Tue, 26 May 2026 17:29:08 +0000

Campus Tor Relay templates: proposal, SOP, and FAQ now published¶

In November 2025, the first campus Tor Relay in Taiwan went live at National Taiwan Normal University's CSIE department. Over the past six months, community member NZ (Su En-Li) — the student who pushed the proposal through — worked with the community to turn that experience into a reusable template kit. The three documents are now published under CC-BY 4.0, with a long-form interview as the entry point.

The templates are ready. The next step is for more universities to take them up.

The template kit¶

Three documents cover the three roles in the rollout sequence: proposal author, technical operator, and the university administration team that gets asked questions.

English translation status

The three community documents below are currently only available in Mandarin. The Mandarin originals are the authoritative source and carry the full Taiwan-specific legal annotations. English versions will be added in a follow-up release.

Proposal template (school-facing document, four outreach email patterns, two-month administrative timeline): https://anoni-net.ipns.dweb.link/community/campus-tor-relay-proposal/
Deployment SOP (torrc, UFW, status page architecture, monitoring runbook, IPv6, handover): https://anoni-net.ipns.dweb.link/community/campus-tor-relay-sop/
FAQ for university administration and legal counsel (ten questions with Taiwan-specific annotations, plus two one-page summaries): https://anoni-net.ipns.dweb.link/community/campus-relay-faq/

The hub page collects all three with case studies, project goals, and a backlog of external resources awaiting translation:

Tor Relay 校園建立研究專題

For readers outside Taiwan¶

The case is grounded in Taiwan's TANet (the academic network) and Taiwanese legal context, but the kit transfers in pieces:

The proposal template's structure — scope, technical resources, operational responsibility, legal positioning, academic value — is reusable across jurisdictions
The outreach email examples show the registers that worked when approaching IT departments and faculty advisors; useful as a tone reference even when the local language and legal context differ
The torrc, UFW, and monitoring setups in the SOP are jurisdiction-agnostic, and the graduation-handover discussion applies to any campus where students will eventually leave
The FAQ's Taiwan-specific legal annotations need to be replaced with local equivalents, but the question structure of "what the university actually worries about" is the more portable part

If your university already runs a relay through EFF's Tor University Challenge program, we'd be glad to compare notes, particularly on how you handled the handover problem.

Why Taiwan still needs more campus relays¶

Tor's anonymity rests on relay diversity. When relays concentrate in a few countries or network providers, the network's ability to resist traffic analysis weakens. Taiwan's relay count on Tor Metrics is still limited, and each stable node adds another margin of resistance. Real-time observation:

Tor Relays watcher

University campuses are a reasonable place to close that gap: stable academic bandwidth, students and staff with the skill to operate the node, a clearer institutional review path than residential or small-company hosting, and direct alignment with EFF's Tor University Challenge.

Taiwan's civil society has been raising attention to whistleblower protection, anti-stalking, and press freedom, areas where Tor's value to local users tracks with the global picture. A campus relay is the concrete contribution of "making this infrastructure usable in Taiwan," closer to the actual situation than an abstract statement about privacy.

NZ's original materials¶

The templates are placeholder-scrubbed, sanitised versions. If you want to see what the real submission looked like, NZ has made the original Google Drive folder fully public:

NZ's original Google Drive folder

It contains the original NTNU project proposal (Google Doc), the slide deck from the December 21, 2025 on-campus sharing session, and on-site photos. The original Doc still carries NZ's personal email, advisor information, and the university's IP range. Please don't fork the raw Doc, change the school name, and submit it — it's easy to spot during review. The value of the archive is for comparing structure and wording. When you actually submit, use the placeholder-scrubbed templates on anoni.net.

The Taiwan case is also documented in English on the Tor Project blog, with NZ's first-hand account:

Setting up a Tor Relay at a university in Taiwan

The full long-form Mandarin interview with NZ on anoni.net covers the year-long arc through the proposal process. If you read Mandarin, this is the most complete record:

在台師大架設 Tor Relay：一段與學校溝通、留下可能性的實作經驗

Acknowledgements¶

The kit's source materials were contributed by NZ (Su En-Li), drawn from his proposal, communication records, and operational experience at NTNU. NZ released the materials under CC-BY 4.0 as a template for other universities to adapt.

Every campus relay that goes live lowers the cost for the schools that follow. If you adapt the kit and roll out a relay at your university, in Taiwan or elsewhere, we'd be glad to hear about it. We can fold your case into the project page so the next wave has more reference points.

The template kit is a shared starting point. Any university can pick it up, rewrite it, and route it through its own internal review. The more schools take part, the more the shared template library grows, and the easier the work becomes for the ones who follow.

Financial Companies as Censors: A Sinophone Asia-Pacific Reading of EFF's Transaction Denied

Toomore Chiang — Tue, 26 May 2026 17:29:08 +0000

Financial Companies as Censors: A Sinophone Asia-Pacific Reading of EFF's Transaction Denied¶

Image from EFF Deeplinks article Former EFF Activism Director's New Book, Transaction Denied, Explores What Happens When Financial Companies Act like Censors (EFF Financial Censorship banner library), licensed under CC BY 4.0.

On 9 May 2017, the cross-border electronic payment service PayPal closed all domestic transaction functions in Taiwan. Two PayPal Taiwan accounts could no longer send money to each other. Cross-border transfers kept working. The streamer economy took the worst hit. Twitch Cheer, YouTube Super Chat, StreamLabs, and NightDev — tools that processed local audience tips through PayPal — went dark on the same day. Small organizations and independent media that relied on PayPal for domestic flows lost a payment rail overnight⁸.

The legal trigger was Article 3, Paragraph 1 of Taiwan's Electronic Payment Institution Management Act, passed in 2015. PayPal chose not to apply for a license and closed domestic functions instead⁹. Nearly nine years later, the U.S. online payment processor Stripe still does not allow individuals or companies in Taiwan to register. Stripe is the credit card collection layer behind Substack, many subscription SaaS products, and many open source sponsorship pages. Individual creators in Taiwan have to first register a U.S. LLC to use it¹⁰.

In Taiwan's payment conversation, these two facts have usually been filed under "compliance trade-offs" or "market size." EFF's former Activism Director Rainey Reitman, in her April 2026 book Transaction Denied¹², compiles cases from 2012 onward across the U.S. and the Middle East. Stacked together, the cases reveal a cross-region, cross-issue pattern that's been running for more than a decade. Taiwan's two events belong in that record. So do parallel events from Hong Kong, mainland China, Macau, Singapore, and Malaysia, which Reitman's book — focused on U.S. and Middle Eastern material — does not yet cover.

What Reitman compiles: a decade-plus of financial censorship cases¶

Rainey Reitman spent 11 years at EFF, serving as Activism Director and later Chief Program Officer, before leaving in 2022. She co-founded the Freedom of the Press Foundation and chairs its board¹¹. Half of the author royalties from this book go to that foundation. In EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn's introduction on Deeplinks¹, she writes: "Rainey is a storyteller and an activist. She uncovers hidden systems of power that shape our choices, our voice, and ultimately our society."

The bulk of the book documents cases that actually happened. The 2012 anti-book-censorship coalition EFF led pushed back PayPal's content restrictions on the self-publishing platform Smashwords³. The same year, the Nifty Archive Alliance case saw Stripe cut payment rails for the LGBTQ erotica writing community that had been running since 1992. After advocacy, Stripe reversed course⁴.

The 2021 Larry Brandt case had no such reversal. Brandt is a U.S. individual donor who used PayPal for nearly 20 years to send small recurring donations to Tor relay operators around the world. One day in 2021, PayPal shut down his account with no warning, no appeals process, and no one able to explain why⁵. Tor is one of the anonymity tools the anoni.net community documents and many readers actually use, and Tor relay operators around the world depend on exactly this kind of individual sponsorship. Translate the case to a context English-language readers in Asia recognize: if you've been sending regular cross-border support to Hong Kong media in exile, Burmese independent journalists, Ukrainian grassroots groups, or any cross-border human rights project, the experience is the same. Small amount, clear purpose, multi-year history — none of it grants immunity.

When a multi-year small-amount donor has a single fresh donation flagged as suspicious and the account terminated, the claim that "financial institutions aren't censors" gets harder to defend. More cases line up: a U.S. citizen who taught Persian poetry had PayPal and Venmo accounts frozen, a New York Muslim city councilmember was blocked because a transfer memo named a Bangladeshi restaurant, and Palestinian users across an entire region were locked out of PayPal⁶.

Reitman points out that this pattern works long-term because the underlying assumption — financial institutions are neutral conduits — is widely accepted. In practice, the combination of overcautious compliance-driven risk avoidance, service terms vague to the point of unpredictability, automated decisions with no human review interface, and no functioning appeals path for those cut off produces an outcome that's effectively the same as content removal⁷. EFF has tracked dozens of these cases over the past decade-plus, faster than any legislature has moved on the issue.

From account blocks to platform content policy: a new chain of cases in 2025-2026¶

The cases Reitman compiles mostly center on financial institutions cutting off individual or organizational accounts. From 2025 onward, a different mode of pressure has emerged. Payment processors use contract terms and fine threats to push platforms into revising their own content policies. The target has shifted from individual accounts to entire platform-level policies.

In February 2025, Mastercard and Visa pressured multiple Japanese cultural-industry platforms, forcing services to adjust what they sold. Japan's domestic card brand JCB and various stored-value mechanisms absorbed some of the impact, allowing the affected services to barely scrape through¹³. In July of the same year, Steam (Valve) confirmed it had removed adult games from its store under payment-processor pressure¹⁴. In March 2026, U.S. FTC Chair Andrew N. Ferguson issued warning letters to PayPal, Stripe, Visa, and Mastercard on "debanking American consumers" — the first time a U.S. federal regulator publicly framed this pattern as an issue¹⁵. In May 2026, Kickstarter revised its content guidelines to ban several categories of NSFW content, with Stripe identified as the pressure source behind the policy change¹⁶.

From individual accounts severed, to entire markets shut out, to platform content policies rewritten by proxy, the reach of financial intermediaries has expanded steadily over the past decade-plus.

Taiwan as case study: PayPal's domestic shutdown, Stripe's continued closure¶

Read PayPal's 2017 domestic shutdown and Stripe's continued closure through Reitman's lens, and both look like the same thing: financial intermediaries unilaterally deciding who can collect money on their networks.

PayPal's case is "compliance-driven domestic shutdown." After Taiwan's Electronic Payment Institution Management Act took effect in 2015, PayPal opted out of applying for a license and closed domestic payment functions. Cross-border functions stayed. Local third-party processors like ECPay, NewebPay, and Pay2Go filled the gap. In hindsight, this localized Taiwan's domestic payment infrastructure further. But applications that had built on PayPal for local Taiwan flows needed an alternative the same day⁸.

Stripe's case is "the market was never opened." Individuals and companies in Taiwan cannot apply for a Stripe account directly. The common workaround is to register a U.S. LLC, apply for an EIN, open a U.S. bank account, and operate Stripe under the U.S. corporate name¹⁰. That route carries its own compliance cost — failure to file IRS Form 5472 starts at a US$25,000 penalty — and the threshold is high for individual creators. In October 2025, Stripe Tax began supporting Taiwan remote-seller tax registration¹², but Stripe Tax handles tax registration only. Taiwan users still cannot open a Stripe payment account.

Neither is "censorship" in the traditional sense, but for advocacy organizations, independent media, and creators, the effect is censorship-shaped. Depending on cross-border payment rails means the primary collection channel can disappear at any time, or may have never existed. Domestic third-party processors fill some of the gap, but cross-border collection, international convergence on KYC, and the gradual rollout of Taiwan's Virtual Asset Service Provider Act are tightening simultaneously. The institutional framing is documented in Mandarin at Taiwan VASP Act 2026 (zh-TW page, en version pending). Organization-side responses sit under Anonymous Donation Channels for Advocacy Organizations (zh-TW page, en version pending).

Sinophone Asia-Pacific: the same mechanisms with regionally specific outcomes¶

Reitman's book doesn't expand into Asia. But the four elements she identifies — overcautious compliance-driven risk avoidance, vague service terms, automated decisions, and absent appeals — map cleanly onto specific events across the Sinophone Asia-Pacific. The differences are who drives the cutoff and what the motivation is.

Mainland China: Account freezes after mandatory real-name registration on WeChat Pay and Alipay are a long-running phenomenon. Transfers touching sensitive topics, cross-border collection, or inbound flows from outside the country trigger "protective freezes" on accounts. The product of state censorship layered onto platform compliance — the mechanism Reitman documents in U.S. cases, with an additional policy-driven layer on top.
Hong Kong: After the 2019–2020 protests, HSBC, Stripe, PayPal, and others faced a mix of international due diligence and local compliance pressure. Accounts belonging to pro-democracy organizations, independent media, and overseas Hong Konger fundraising platforms have been frozen or terminated repeatedly. Domestic regulation and external due diligence tightened during the same window.
Macau: AML compliance pressure from the gaming industry spills over to ordinary users. Cross-border small transfers easily trigger EDD (enhanced due diligence), and independent media or human rights workers find their cross-border collection options thinning.
Singapore: The Monetary Authority of Singapore's Payment Services Act and the 2023 onward tightening of crypto/DPT licensing make it difficult for startups, independent creators, and cross-border NGOs to access stable collection infrastructure inside the country. Some foreign providers have stopped accepting Singapore registrants outright.
Malaysia: Bank Negara Malaysia's convergence on e-wallet KYC and existing foreign exchange controls make it hard for domestic users to receive small cross-border donations. Independent media and human rights NGOs need to route cross-border flows through longer paths.

Taiwan's situation — PayPal closed in 2017, Stripe never opened — belongs to the same family of mechanisms. The Taiwan payment conversation simply tends to file these under "compliance trade-offs" rather than identify them as financial censorship.

For English-language readers approaching this from outside the region, the takeaway is that Reitman's framework — financial intermediaries as de facto censors — extends well into the Sinophone Asia-Pacific. The U.S. and Middle Eastern cases in her book are well-documented and serve as the global anchor. The Sinophone Asia-Pacific cases summarized above are not yet catalogued at the same level of detail. That gap is exactly where the anoni.net community wants to contribute.

What the community wants to advance next¶

The community set anonymous payments as one of three 2026 focus areas. The original framing was "individual financial flows are an independent dimension of metadata." Reitman's book reframes the question: financial flows can be actively wielded as a censorship tool, and the risk is not abstract for advocacy organizations, independent media, or creators.

The existing Why Anonymous Payments Matter anchor (zh-TW page, en version pending) addresses payment flows as passively observed. This post addresses payment flows as actively cut off. Reading both together gives the fuller picture.

Next steps planned include adding a "cross-border sanctions and over-compliance side effects" section to Taiwan VASP Act 2026, and selecting 5–8 EFF Financial Censorship articles from the past decade-plus for curated translation. Tracking the progress of alternative payment systems is also part of the picture. Europe's European Payments Initiative and Brazil's Pix are two existing implementations¹⁷¹⁸, though payment rails are heavily regulated in every jurisdiction and building a scaled alternative is not cheap. The Anonymous Payments Research Track (zh-TW page, en version pending) is where the community discussion and translation backlog live.

For English-language readers who want the underlying material, EFF's Financial Censorship issue page{target="blank"} is the best entry point. _Transaction Denied is available from Beacon Press.

Internet Freedom: why the broader internet freedom frame matters for payment infrastructure
LGBTQ+ scenarios: a scenario page covering anonymous social participation, which intersects with payment privacy
Existing English coverage is sparse on payments. Several Mandarin anchor pages are linked above and will be ported to English on the roadmap.

Former EFF Activism Director's New Book, Transaction Denied, Explores What Happens When Financial Companies Act like Censors - EFF Deeplinks ↩↩
Transaction Denied book page - Beacon Press ↩
Free Speech Coalition Calls on PayPal to Back Off Misguided Book Censorship Policy - EFF Deeplinks ↩
Payment Provider Stripe Upholds Free Speech, Reactivates Nifty Archives - EFF Deeplinks ↩
PayPal Shuts Down Long-Time Tor Supporter with No Recourse - EFF Deeplinks ↩
Why Is PayPal Denying Service to Palestinians? - EFF Deeplinks ↩
Financial Censorship issue page - EFF ↩
PayPal withdraws, Taiwan local payment platforms rise - TechNews (in Mandarin) ↩↩
Streamer donations affected? PayPal announces end to Taiwan domestic transactions - Bahamut GNN (in Mandarin) ↩
Essential guide for Taiwan creators: platform fees and remittance back to Taiwan - most.tw (in Mandarin) ↩↩
Rainey Reitman - EFF Staff (11 years at EFF, co-founder and current board chair of the Freedom of the Press Foundation) ↩
Adds support for remote sellers in Taiwan to Stripe Tax - Stripe Changelog (2025-10-29) ↩
Mastercard and VISA's Offensive Against Japanese Cultural Industries - Gea-Suan Lin's BLOG (in Mandarin) ↩
Steam (Valve) confirms adult games removed under payment processor pressure - Gea-Suan Lin's BLOG (in Mandarin) ↩
FTC Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson Issues Warning Letters to CEOs of PayPal, Stripe, Visa and Mastercard About Debanking American Consumers - U.S. Federal Trade Commission ↩
Kickstarter Is The Latest Platform Seemingly Forced To Ban Adult Content By Payment Processors - Kotaku ↩
European Payments Initiative - Wikipedia ↩
Pix (payment system) - Wikipedia ↩

onionoo MCP is now public: query the Tor relay network in plain language

Toomore Chiang — Tue, 26 May 2026 17:29:08 +0000

onionoo MCP is now public: query the Tor relay network in plain language¶

The community-hosted onionoo-fastapi service is now public at https://onionoo.anoni.net, released as v1.0.0. It wraps the Tor Project's official Onionoo API in two interfaces: a semantic HTTP API with a full OpenAPI document, and a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server.

Connect it to Claude Desktop, Cursor, Claude Code, or any MCP-capable client and you can ask a single question like "how many running Tor relays does Taiwan have right now, what is the total bandwidth, and what are the top five ASNs?" The agent breaks the question down, picks tools, fetches the data, and returns a readable summary. You do not need to learn Onionoo's field schema before starting research.

Why wrap Onionoo at all¶

Onionoo's specification is complete, but it has three hurdles for AI agents.

It has no OpenAPI description, so Swagger UI, Postman, and code generators cannot consume it directly.
Its compact field names (r, f, n, a, and so on) are designed for transport efficiency, not semantic clarity. Language models routinely confuse r with relay or running.
A single useful query often spans multiple endpoints (details plus uptime plus bandwidth). Agents that hand-roll that composition tend to make mistakes.

onionoo-fastapi takes care of those problems. Compact codes are renamed to nickname, fingerprint, addresses, running, and so on. A full OpenAPI document is published. Common multi-endpoint tasks are exposed as single MCP tool calls. One call returns the merged details, uptime, and bandwidth snapshot for a relay, instead of you stitching three endpoints together.

The service does not store any Onionoo data. It only forwards requests and reshapes responses. The upstream is https://onionoo.torproject.org.

What you can ask¶

Once connected, you can ask the agent the following sorts of questions in plain language.

Audit a country's Tor footprint: "Summarize Taiwan's running Tor relays. Count, total bandwidth, consensus weight, top five ASNs, and pick the three relays with the highest consensus weight."
Inspect a specific ASN: "List all running Tor relays under TANet (AS1659), including their flags, bandwidth, and uptime."
Compare fingerprints: "Compare 9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31 and 847B1F850344D7876491A54892F904934E4EB85D. Versions, flags, country, and AS."
Single-relay health check: "Tell me the current status of relay moria1. Country, last week's bandwidth trend, and uptime."

Claude Desktop connected to onionoo MCP, replying to "Summarize Taiwan's Tor relays" with a structured report. The numbers come from upstream Onionoo and represent a point-in-time snapshot.

The pre-MCP version of this workflow meant skimming the Onionoo docs, writing a script, merging JSON, and formatting a table. A single sentence now gets you to a first-cut answer, and the cost of starting a piece of research drops sharply.

How to connect¶

For AI client users¶

In Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any other MCP-capable client, add this to the mcpServers section of the config:

{  "mcpServers": {  "onionoo": {  "type": "http",  "url": "https://onionoo.anoni.net/mcp"  }  } }

Save the config, restart the client, and the onionoo tool set will appear in the tool list. The full guide covers local stdio transport setup, all available tools, permission options, and self-hosted (Docker) instructions.

Read the full onionoo MCP guide

For direct API users¶

Each endpoint returns semantic JSON and can be called with curl:

# Taiwan relays, top 5 by consensus weight curl -s 'https://onionoo.anoni.net/v1/details?country=tw&running=true&order=-consensus_weight&limit=5' | jq . # Running relay counts aggregated by country curl -s 'https://onionoo.anoni.net/v1/aggregate/countries?running=true' | jq .

The full endpoint list and parameters are in the Swagger UI. Query parameters follow Onionoo's official specification.

Where this fits alongside our other observation tools¶

anoni.net now has three entry points for Tor network observation, each suited to a different task.

Tor Relays watcher (Mandarin): chart dashboards for Taiwan's relay counts and bandwidth trends. Good when you want to see how something has moved over time.
ASN observation coverage analysis (Mandarin): OONI observation data broken down by ASN. Good when you want to know which ASNs are actually being measured.
onionoo MCP (new): ask ad-hoc questions in plain language. Good when you want to scope out a specific relay, ASN, or country.

The three rely on different data sources (Pulse's own historical time series, OONI's raw observation data, and Onionoo's live snapshots) and complement each other rather than duplicating coverage.

Contribute or report back¶

File issues or feature requests: https://github.com/anoni-net/onionoo-fastapi/issues
To discuss which task-oriented tools we should add next, or to ask the community to demonstrate a particular query, drop by our Matrix room (the landing page is in Mandarin, English is welcome in the room).
To run your own instance (for a .onion service, internal network, or experimentation), the "Self-hosting (Docker)" section of the full guide has Docker commands and the full environment variable list.

The service is released under the MIT license. Source code: https://github.com/anoni-net/onionoo-fastapi. Issues and PRs welcome.

onionoo MCP: a query service for Tor relays — full usage guide
Tor Relays watcher (Mandarin)
ASN observation coverage analysis (Mandarin)
What is Tor? (Mandarin)

MADLink (Mandarin Translation) is Live, with an Editorial Observation Page on Taiwan's Response

Toomore Chiang — Tue, 26 May 2026 17:29:08 +0000

MADLink (Mandarin Translation) is Live, with an Editorial Observation Page on Taiwan's Response¶

A publicly listed Taipei-traded company shipped 1,708 CSA-7400 high-density network platforms to a Chinese customer between 2019 and 2020. Those appliances ended up in Kazakhstan running a national-grade internet censorship and surveillance system. The supplier was ADLINK Technologies (TWSE: 6166), the customer was Geedge Networks, and the system they ran was the flagship Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG), an offering whose capabilities rival China's Great Firewall.

That is the central finding of MADLink: A Taiwanese Vestige in the Geedge Supply Chain, InterSecLab's April 2026 report and the first follow-up to their September 2025 The Internet Coup. The anoni.net community has completed the Mandarin (Taiwan terminology, zh-TW) translation. Unlike the previous Internet Coup release, this round also ships an editorial observation page mapping how Taiwan's media, government, and legislators have received the report — with an English summary written for international readers.

What the report found¶

Between 2019 and 2020, ADLINK shipped 1,708 CSA-7400 appliances to Geedge. They formed the hardware foundation of Geedge's first-generation firewall platform, deployed in Kazakhstan to enable national-scale internet censorship and surveillance. CSA-7400 is a 4U high-density platform that ADLINK itself markets for deep packet inspection (DPI) and firewall workloads.

ADLINK hardware also turned up inside EtherFabric — a custom-built network packet broker (NPB) that Geedge deploys in Myanmar to load-balance traffic across multiple TSG nodes. A MAC address recovered from leaked documents traces back to ADLINK, showing ADLINK's footprint in Geedge's product line goes beyond the single CSA-7400 transaction.

Geedge's current-generation TSG hardware (deployed in Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Myanmar) is built on Nettrix servers (a subsidiary of US-sanctioned Sugon) with Inspur storage. These are commodity x86 components, sourceable on the grey market even where direct procurement is restricted. The report's argument: purpose-built surveillance hardware like the CSA-7400 and the ADLINK components inside EtherFabric is exactly where export controls have the most leverage, in contrast to commodity servers.

The Mandarin translation: reading path¶

The full translation lives here: MADLink / A Taiwanese Vestige in the Geedge Supply Chain (zh-TW) (Mandarin translation maintained in zh-TW only).

The original report is a single long web page. The translation team split it into 5 chapters so that Matrix discussions can map to specific sections:

Chapter 1/5: Executive Summary, What We Found, Why It Matters
Chapter 2/5: Geedge supply chain deep dive (three generations of TSG hardware)
Chapter 3/5: EtherFabric and ADLINK's role and response
Chapter 4/5: Conclusion
Chapter 5/5: Appendix (ADLINK and MOEA full statements)

ADLINK's full reply to InterSecLab is preserved verbatim in the appendix so readers can compare both sides directly.

What's new this round: the editorial observation page¶

For The Internet Coup, our work ended with a faithful translation. MADLink names a publicly listed Taiwanese company, which would normally trigger the expected loop of local press follow-up, legislative questioning, and a regulator response. As of 2026-05-20, Taiwan's Chinese-language public sphere has stayed noticeably quiet. That silence is itself observation material, so we added a separate page: Editorial observation: Taiwan's response to MADLink.

This page is explicitly an anoni.net editorial work, not part of the InterSecLab report. It has five sections:

Independent verification: Before recording the local reception, we ran reproducible verification on the report's key claims — the IEEE OUI 00:30:64 resolving to ADLINK on two independent lookup services (macvendors / macvendorlookup), ADLINK's own product page marketing the CSA-7400 for DPI / IDS/IPS / NGFW, Geedge (Hainan) Information Technology Co., Ltd. being founded by Fang Binxing in 2018 (cross-confirmed by Chinese Wikipedia, Epoch Times, and NTD), and the New Bloom Magazine April 2026 article's existence and date.

Coverage map: International / English coverage is present (InterSecLab original, New Bloom Magazine, cybernews, and others). Taiwan Chinese-language coverage is substantively absent — major outlets (UDN, Liberty Times, CNA, TVBS, TechNews, iThome) had no direct reporting on this angle as of 2026-05-16. Legislator Puma Shen, quoted in the original report, has not followed up publicly.

Why Taiwan has been quiet: Five observed factors, offered as hypotheses rather than verdicts — high technical barrier for general-audience journalists, domestic infosec media focusing on enterprise security rather than human-rights export controls, the September 2025 leak news cycle having cooled by April 2026, neither political camp having upside in amplifying the story, and Taiwan's civil-society attention focusing elsewhere.

Indicators to watch: Grouped by government / media / civil society, with concrete entry points (URLs for the MOEA strategic high-tech export entity list, Legislative Yuan IVOD and proceedings systems, the Market Observation Post System under stock code 6166, and Control Yuan corrective measures) plus a four-tier execution table (Google Alerts, manual checks, RSS / HTML diff bots, scheduled scrapers) so contributors of different technical means can pick a level that fits.

English summary for international readers: The complete English version, so readers connecting from outside Taiwan can follow the local reception context without going through the Chinese sections.

Why we wrote this page¶

MADLink's central question — whether Taiwan's export control framework can prevent local companies from supplying surveillance and censorship technology to vendors serving authoritarian governments — does not get answered by an English report alone. It needs local journalism, legislative questioning, and civil-society advocacy to follow up before regulators face real pressure to update the framework.

When that loop has not started, documenting the current state of reception is itself a form of relay. As substantive developments arrive (media starting to follow the thread, legislators raising the issue publicly, ADLINK filing a material announcement, or the MOEA updating the framework), the editorial observation page will be updated inline with date stamps and synced through Matrix.

Acknowledgements and how to join¶

Thanks to InterSecLab for continuing this investigative series, and to community members who contributed to translation and the editorial observation write-up.

Both reports (The Internet Coup and MADLink) share the same Matrix discussion channel:

https://matrix.to/#/#interseclab-the-internet-coup:im.anoni.net

If you spot reporting, government documents, or public statements not yet captured on the editorial observation page, please open a pull request via the edit icon at the top of that page or share in the Matrix channel.

CryptPad 2026.5.0: zh_Hant Lands as a Built-in Locale After Two and a Half Years Upstream

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 23 May 2026 02:16:49 +0000

CryptPad 2026.5.0: zh_Hant Lands as a Built-in Locale After Two and a Half Years Upstream¶

cryptpad.anoni.net Drive home after switching to 中文(正體). Every file category and app entry is localised.

For people who want a collaboration tool that does not silently keep a readable copy of their work on the server, the practical options are short. Google Docs, Notion, Microsoft 365 are excellent products, but every paragraph and every revision sits on those vendors’ servers in a form they can read. From there, algorithms, ads, training corpora, and government data requests each have their own path in.

That difference is exactly what matters when a journalist drafts a story that cannot leak, when a campaigner negotiates a strategy that cannot be wiretapped, when an NGO records distress reports from vulnerable users, or when a researcher works on a politically sensitive topic. Whether a first draft can be safely written at all often turns on that one architectural choice.

CryptPad is one of the few collaboration suites where the server genuinely cannot read what you wrote. Content is encrypted in your browser, the server only ever sees ciphertext, and yet a single interface covers most of what people normally reach for in Google Docs, Sheets, Slides, kanban boards, whiteboards, forms, and calendars.

Until recently the suite had one obvious gap for one large group of users: the UI shipped in English and Simplified Chinese only, with Traditional Chinese (zh_Hant) missing. From the first upstream PR opened at the end of 2023, through two and a half years of patient string-by-string work in Weblate, to the CryptPad 2026.5.0 “🌷 Spring release” on 2026/05/13, zh_Hant is now a built-in locale. The community-hosted cryptpad.anoni.net has been upgraded. Open cryptpad.anoni.net today and the Drive, the document editors, and the share-permission dialog are all in Traditional Chinese. Readers in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and across the Chinese-reading diaspora can use it without first learning an English menu.

What CryptPad is¶

CryptPad is developed by XWiki SAS in France under the AGPLv3 licence and is best described as an end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) online office and collaboration suite. One account gets you:

Rich Text: a Google-Docs-style WYSIWYG editor
Document: advanced word processing via OnlyOffice (.docx compatible)
Sheets: spreadsheets via OnlyOffice (.xlsx compatible)
Presentation: slides, with both Markdown Slides and OnlyOffice modes
Kanban: project boards
Whiteboard: free-form whiteboarding
Diagram: diagramming via Drawio (upgraded to Drawio 29.6.7 in 2026.5.0)
Forms: surveys and structured data collection
Calendar: shared calendars
Code/Markdown: code and Markdown editors
Drive: cloud storage that ties all of the above together

The core property is that all content is encrypted in your browser before it ever reaches the server. The server stores ciphertext; neither CryptPad’s operators nor the anoni.net maintainers hold the keys. This is what is meant by zero-knowledge: even if we wanted to read your pads, we couldn’t.

The Rich Text app in multi-user mode. Every edit is encrypted in the browser; the server only ever sees ciphertext.

Why the community self-hosts CryptPad¶

We self-host more than CryptPad. There is also Etherpad for quick shared notes and Matrix for live discussion (the Community page covers how the three fit together). CryptPad is what we reach for whenever a document needs long-term storage, end-to-end encryption, and full multi-user collaboration in the same place. Spending two and a half years on the Traditional Chinese translation made sense for several reasons.

E2EE and zero-knowledge by design. Community discussions routinely touch threat models, whistleblower-protection notes, and the back-and-forth of pushing Tor relays onto university campuses. Putting those in Google Docs or Notion is functionally identical to handing every unpublished strategy to a third-party platform and its advertising partners. CryptPad removes “the operator can read your content” at the architectural level — a guarantee that is far stronger than an SLA promise.

Feature-complete enough to replace mainstream cloud suites. Etherpad is fine for quick notes but does not cover sheets, slides, or kanban. CryptPad covers most of what people use Google Workspace for, and every pad inherits the same encryption and permission model. There is no need to keep switching tools because “this one needs to stay private and that one doesn’t”.

Every pad uses the same encryption and permission model. Sharing supports view-only / edit / embed, with optional password and expiry.

AGPLv3 licence, public cryptographic protocol. Any derived service has to remain open, so when we self-host we can audit the code top to bottom. The cryptographic protocol and data structures are also public — like Tor, Tails, and OONI, this is privacy that is verifiable rather than asserted.

Governance stays with maintainers and the community. The same reasoning we wrote up in why we self-host Matrix applies here. Retention policy, registration policy, channel rules are decisions we make ourselves; they are predictable, accountable, and can move with the community’s needs.

Real European public-sector and civil-society deployments. CryptPad is in use across multiple European government projects, NGOs, and research groups. Compliance, reliability, and long-term maintenance all have a track record. When we recommend it to more Chinese-reading users, we are not pointing them at a demo-grade toy.

Two and a half years of upstream work, mapped to a timeline¶

The CryptPad main application, the Accounts plugin, and the User Guide together contain over a thousand strings. Each one has to match the UI context where it appears, stay consistent across contexts (so that Save and Save As don’t drift into different verbs), and survive the constant trickle of new strings from active development. Every release means another pass over what changed.

2023/12/05. PR #1329 opened upstream. It corrected the language-menu labels — changing the zh-Hans entry to “中文(簡體)” and zh-Hant to “中文(正體)” — and used the description to ask CryptPad maintainers what process to follow to add a real zh_Hant translation, since at that point only zh_Hans had any content and zh_Hant was empty.

2024–2025. The CryptPad team opened zh_Hant translation spaces on Weblate across multiple sub-projects: the main App, the Accounts plugin, and the User Guide sections (Drive, FAQ, Application Document, Application General, Application Presentation, Share and Access, Collaboration, and more).

2026/03/13. All of the above reached translation completion. The community filed Issue #2237 upstream to report the milestone and to ask CryptPad maintainers to enable zh_Hant as a built-in selectable locale in the next release.

2026/05/13. CryptPad 2026.5.0 “🌷 Spring release” shipped. The Improvements section of the release notes lists, verbatim:

Enable zh-Hant/zh-Hans locales (#2237) and add alias system for locales #2254 by @toomore

That single PR not only turned on zh_Hant and zh_Hans as official locales, but also added a locale-alias mechanism so that accounts still configured with zh_CN or zh_TW (the older codes) automatically fall back to the new zh_Hans and zh_Hant, instead of getting pushed back to English after the upgrade. Existing Simplified Chinese users see their UI carry on as Chinese without having to reset anything.

A note on 正體 vs 繁體 — naming the script¶

CryptPad’s language menu originally read “中文(繁體)” for the zh_Hant entry — fántǐ, literally “complex form”. PR #1329 changed it to “中文(正體)” — zhèngtǐ, roughly “proper” or “standard” form. The community prefers 正體 because 繁 (complex) implies “more complex than Simplified”, whereas the script as used in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau is simply the historically continuous form of written Chinese, with no “more elaborate than” relationship to anything.

Operating systems and most English-language writing still call it Traditional Chinese, and we are not asking anyone to change that across the board. Where we are doing the translation work ourselves, we use the name we prefer. How a community names its own script is part of the localisation work.

Using cryptpad.anoni.net from a censored or restricted network¶

cryptpad.anoni.net and cryptpad.org are not specifically hosted to be reachable from inside heavily filtered networks. Readers connecting from mainland China, Iran, Russia, or similar environments may see unstable or blocked connections. Recommended approaches:

Tor Browser reaches cryptpad.anoni.net over the Tor network, HTTPS by default. If the Tor network itself is blocked from your ISP, use Snowflake or request obfs4 bridges.
A VPN you trust. The VPN operator can see your connection metadata, but CryptPad’s end-to-end encryption guarantees that no intermediary — VPN, ISP, or server operator — can read your content.
Tails boots an entire operating system that routes all traffic through Tor and leaves no trace on the host machine. A good fit for higher-sensitivity collaboration.

CryptPad is E2EE regardless of how you connect; whether you reach it over Tor, a VPN, or direct, the server cannot read your content. The variable is whether you can reach cryptpad.anoni.net at all from your local network. For ongoing use in heavily restricted environments, Tor with Snowflake or Tails is the more reliable baseline.

Getting started on cryptpad.anoni.net¶

To start:

Entry point: https://cryptpad.anoni.net/
Account requests: email whisper@anoni.net for a registration code. Default quota is 50 MB, adjustable later. Registration does not ask for an email address inside the system and does not bind to a real-name identity, matching the Matrix flow.
Switching locale: after the upgrade, the top-right settings page offers “中文(正體)” and “中文(簡體)”. The query strings ?lang=zh_Hant or ?lang=zh_Hans also work.
Full tooling list: see Community.

If you spot a typo, awkward wording, or a new string that hasn’t been translated yet, contributions are very welcome — head straight to the zh_Hant or zh_Hans project on Weblate, or email whisper@anoni.net to let us know.

Setting Up a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University: A Practical Experience of Communicating with the University and Leaving Open Possibilities

Toomore Chiang — Sun, 17 May 2026 04:47:22 +0000

Setting Up a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University: A Practical Experience of Communicating with the University and Leaving Open Possibilities¶

Preface: Why Talk About Anonymous Networks on Campus?¶

In an era where the internet is highly monitored and centrally managed, anonymous communication has become a fundamental requirement for safe exploration, research, and expression. For Taiwan, this issue is especially tangible. Situated at a critical position in East Asia, internet freedom and communication resilience are core societal capabilities that get tested by real-world conditions.

Universities and academic networks have historically been the earliest places where new technologies and public infrastructure are experimented with. The following interview documents how a computer science student at National Taiwan Normal University, also a member of the anonymous network community, stepped into institutional reality on campus, communicated with the university, and attempted to actually set up a Tor Relay.

Within the anonymous network community, we often talk about technology and ideals. But the truly difficult question is often whether “this machine can survive in the real world.” Configuring the Tor Relay itself is comparatively straightforward.

This time, we interviewed a partner from the anonymous network community, NZ, who is currently studying in the Department of Computer Science at National Taiwan Normal University. He successfully set up a Tor Relay on campus, choosing to engage openly with the university system and complete the full administrative process, without going behind anyone's back.

蘇恩立 (Su En-Li, NZ) is currently a third-year undergraduate student in the Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering at National Taiwan Normal University. With a strong interest in information security and network governance, he is currently responsible for operating and maintaining the first Tor node on Taiwan Academic Network (TANet). In addition to hands-on technical practice, he is also dedicated to knowledge sharing, serving as an anonymous network course instructor in the GDGoC NTNU student club. He has long been involved in Taiwan’s open source and information security communities, and has volunteered multiple times at major technical conferences such as SITCON, HITCON, and COSCUP, demonstrating both community service experience and strong technical passion.

Why Set Up a Tor Relay at a University?¶

His motivation was actually quite simple: if anonymous networks in Taiwan only ever exist within niche communities, on overseas VPSs, or are treated as tools in a legal or moral gray area, then they are unlikely to be taken seriously. Universities—especially academic networks like TANet—are inherently meant to support research, experimentation, and public interest. In theory, they should be able to accommodate attempts to deploy this kind of foundational infrastructure.

That said, he was also fully aware of the real-world constraints. Taiwan’s academic network is highly centralized, with outbound connectivity controlled by the Ministry of Education. Within such a structure, anonymous networks are inherently constrained and unable to realize their full potential.

But precisely because of these limitations, he wanted to find out: “Under such constraints, can it at least exist?”

How Did He Talk to the University? The Key Wasn’t Persuasion, but Giving Them Something They Could Account For¶

Administrative Process Timeline

When it came to taking action, he explained Tor in terms the university could understand, avoiding any framing that would make it sound “cool” or radical:

This is a Tor Relay, not an Exit Node
It does not directly provide content to external users
It is an experiment in network infrastructure and anonymous communication

Process-wise, he engaged in actual email exchanges with network administrators, professors, and the department chair, ensuring that everyone who needed to sign off (or be “CC’d”) understood exactly what this machine was doing. The university’s stance landed on a single line: “if the Ministry of Education asks us about this, we need to be able to explain it.” It did not require them to fully understand Tor, and that became the entry point for communication.

The Administrative Process Is Truly a Hassle, but Not a Dead End¶

Project Proposal Document

At National Taiwan Normal University, all outbound connections are blocked by default. Any service requires applying for an exception, including specifying IP addresses, intended use, and supporting documentation, and ultimately ensuring it aligns with the university’s reporting procedures to the Ministry of Education. He described this process as “annoying, but predictable.”

As long as one is willing to write the paperwork and explain things clearly, this path does exist.

Student Organizations and Outreach: Helping Tor Step Out of Its Label on Campus¶

Student Organization Event: Anonymous Network Workshop

Beyond the machine itself, he also organized anonymous network–related activities through student clubs on campus, introducing Tor, anonymous communication, and the design principles behind them. Even if participation wasn’t always large, it at least created space on campus to clearly explain that “anonymous networks ≠ criminal tools,” and to step beyond the usual stereotypes.

These accumulated efforts may not be highly visible, but they are important.

Practical Advice and Pitfalls for Others¶

The following points are distilled from this experience, intended as a reference for anyone who wants to promote or deploy a Tor Relay on a university campus in the future.

Actionable Advice¶

Take the public route from the start: don’t wait until something goes wrong to explain—let network administrators and supervising professors know what you are doing early on.
Clearly distinguish between a Tor Relay and an Exit Node: this is almost always the deciding factor in whether communication succeeds, so be explicit about the difference in risk.
Explain things in a way the university can “account for”: the goal is to make sure they can answer questions when asked; you don’t need to win faculty over to anonymous network advocacy.
Expect a lot of paperwork: IP addresses, outbound connectivity, and usage descriptions are all basic requirements.

Common Pitfalls¶

Assuming technical correctness is enough: within academic networks, institutional processes often determine success or failure before technology does.
Underestimating the Ministry of Education’s level of control: most universities block outbound connections by default, and any exceptions must align with formal reporting procedures.
Failing to plan for maintenance and account ownership: account privileges after graduation directly affect whether long-term operation is possible.

Conclusion¶

This attempt to deploy a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University is just one step in an ongoing process. It does not aim to define an endpoint, and it was never meant to become a standard answer. But it does prove at least one thing:

Within Taiwanese universities, as long as one is willing to communicate and explain,
Anonymous networks can still find a place to exist.

If we hope to see Tor Relays on more campuses in the future, these “uncool but time-consuming” efforts may well be the most important foundation of all.

Further Reflection: Why Are Attempts Like This Worth Preserving?

After reading this interview, it is easy to focus on “what he accomplished.” But for the anonymous network community, what is truly worth recording is how this was accomplished.

In Taiwan, anonymous networks do not lack technical documentation or ideological support. What is truly scarce are experiences of “having walked through the real institutional system once.” Especially in an environment where academic networks are highly centralized and outbound connectivity is tightly controlled, distributed anonymous infrastructure like Tor Relays is inherently difficult to sustain.

This implementation at National Taiwan Normal University was a concrete attempt made within real-world institutions; its purpose was never to provide a final answer for anonymous networks. It may not immediately improve the performance or security of anonymous networks, and it may not transfer directly into a reproducible standard process, but it did leave behind a clearly visible path of practice: one that can be understood, referenced, and built upon.

This path shows us that:

Anonymous networks can have a legitimate, public place on Taiwanese campuses
Campuses can be engaged in dialogue, as long as someone is willing to explain things properly
Administrative procedures are cumbersome, but they can actually be navigated through
Beyond technology, language, patience, and institutional understanding are equally important

For Taiwan, the advancement of anonymous networks often emerges from the accumulation of these seemingly slow, tedious, and even somewhat clumsy attempts. A “killer application” is unlikely to be the starting point at all.

If, in the future, we hope to see Tor Relays or other anonymous communication infrastructure across more universities and academic network nodes, then these early experiences—whether successful or obstructed—are all worth recording, discussing, and passing on.

The existence of anonymous networks is the outcome of communities engaging in long-term communication, mutual understanding, and collaboration; individual actions are only one part of that. Through such processes, internet freedom can move from an abstract concept to a public infrastructure that can truly be put into practice.

Tor × EFF University Challenge: Make Your Campus Part of the Anonymous Network

The Tor Project and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) jointly run the Tor University Challenge, inviting university students around the world to set up Tor Relays on their campuses using academic networks. By successfully deploying and maintaining a Tor Relay within a university network, participating institutions can have their university names listed on the project’s official website—showing the world that their campus is actively contributing to the infrastructure of anonymous communication and internet freedom.

This is both a technical challenge and a symbolic act: it represents a university’s willingness to support the practice of privacy, anonymity, and an open internet within the realms of education and research. In the National Taiwan Normal University case discussed here, we have already seen that as long as there is a willingness to communicate and understand institutional constraints, Tor Relays do have a chance to exist on Taiwanese campuses.

If you are currently a university student with an interest in networking, cybersecurity, privacy, or public infrastructure, the Tor University Challenge offers a concrete and documentable starting point: let your actions extend beyond your own computer and be seen by the world.

Project website: https://toruniversity.eff.org

The Role of Tor Relays in Academic Networks

Many people have heard of Tor, but do not necessarily understand its significance within academic networks.

What Is a Tor Relay?

Tor is an anonymous communication network that routes traffic through multiple nodes using layered encryption. A Tor Relay (middle relay) helps forward encrypted traffic and, by design, cannot see either the user’s source or the final destination.

It functions purely as a traffic relay; it does not host content and does not act as an exit node.

Why Are Academic Networks Suitable for Discussing Tor Relays?

Academic networks are inherently meant to support experimentation
Universities carry public responsibility and research legitimacy
Experience can be accumulated in a controlled environment, without having to rely solely on overseas resources

At the same time, Taiwan’s academic network is highly centralized and externally controlled, which makes Tor’s presence here more like a “compressed experiment.”

Why Is It Still Worth Doing Even If the Impact Is Limited?

Because beyond performance, the work also helps to:

Leave behind an institutionally “viable path”
Accumulate experience in communicating with universities
Bring anonymous networks into public discussion, moving them out of underground territory and into open conversation

From Discord’s Age Verification to Why We Self-Host Matrix

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

From Discord’s Age Verification to Why We Self-Host Matrix¶

On 2026/02/09, Discord announced a global “teen-by-default” rollout and stronger age verification (English coverage: BBC, Medianama). New and existing users will default to a teen-oriented experience; to relax content filters or access age-gated spaces, users must complete verification via facial age estimation or by submitting ID. Discord frames this as a commitment to teen safety and Safer Internet Day, and will use an “age inference model” in the background to help assign age groups.

We are not dismissing Discord’s intent—youth protection and compliance are serious. But such measures also mean one thing: large platforms will need more personal data and behavioural signals to “classify” users. Whether via face scans, ID documents, or algorithmic inference, the result is handing over “who you are, how old you are, where you are” to the platform and its partners. For many people who just want to chat, game, or collaborate, that may be an acceptable trade-off; for others, it raises the question: is there another way?

What we care about: who decides the rules, who holds the data¶

Commercial chat platforms have their own rules: terms of service, product direction, what data is retained, how algorithms and policies work—mostly driven by the company and shareholders, with little say for ordinary users and little visibility into how their data is used. This isn’t about “who is worse”; it’s about who gets to decide.

The anoni.net community has chosen a different path: self-hosting a Matrix homeserver. We run tuwunel, a high-performance Matrix homeserver implemented in Rust, on im.anoni.net for community discussion and 2026 theme collaboration. Server configuration, retention policy, and channel rules are decided by operators and the community together—smaller scope, more predictable, and more transparent. Our focus is clear: internet freedom, anonymous networks, and privacy in practice, not “anyone can join and talk about anything.” This is a themed, consensus-oriented workspace.

Why we self-host Matrix (tuwunel + im.anoni.net)¶

Matrix is an open, decentralised real-time communication protocol and ecosystem, enabling different platforms worldwide to communicate and interoperate securely. Anyone can run their own Matrix homeserver and set their own server rules, retention, and verification policy. We therefore self-host im.anoni.net and use tuwunel (a high-performance Matrix homeserver written in Rust) to serve the community.

We use a registration-code system: you obtain a registration code by emailing whisper@anoni.net or through another trusted channel, then use that code to register on Matrix. At registration time we do not require an email address; you choose your own username, and the server does not store identity-linked registration records. Codes are reusable (not single-use), so they cannot be used to infer who registered or when. So: there is one point of contact when obtaining a code, but inside the system, registration and usage are not tied to email or real name—we keep “who is who” to the minimum needed to run the service.

The benefits of self-hosting and this flow are straightforward:

Minimal logging and tracking: we keep “who did what when” to the smallest scope we can, and delete when we can.
No real-name or verification requirement: no mandatory ID upload, no phone or email—just a registration code to sign up.
Policies designed for sensitive topics and anonymous research: whether you work on anonymous networks, censorship measurement, or other high-sensitivity areas, you don’t have to worry about account exposure; we will adjust policy as the community needs.

So we chose Matrix not simply because Discord is “bad”—rather, large platforms must serve business and the general public, while we need a space where we decide the rules, minimise data collection, and prioritise anonymity and privacy.

Between privacy and community quality: why we use an application process¶

So Matrix (im.anoni.net) and Cryptpad accounts both require a registration code, which you get by emailing whisper@anoni.net or through another trusted channel. We (or that channel) reply with instructions or the code, and you then complete registration in the client. We do not allow open one-click signup, so we can reduce abuse while keeping “no identity stored at registration” as above.

A brief note on Cryptpad: Cryptpad is an end-to-end encrypted, privacy-focused collaborative platform for shared pads, real-time notes, documents, to-do lists, whiteboards, and more. Content is encrypted throughout; only participants can access it. Unlike Google Docs and similar tools, Cryptpad has no server-side decryption and does not require trusting the operator—well suited to confidential or privacy-sensitive collaboration. We self-host Cryptpad so the community can discuss, co-edit, and collaborate with minimal risk of third-party collection or surveillance.

Why an application process:

To avoid abuse: open registration would quickly attract bots and bad actors; for a small self-hosted service, moderation would become unsustainable.
So everyone who joins knows what this space is: applicants understand that this is for themes like “personal privacy guidelines,” “Tor relays on campus,” and “anonymous payments”—not a general-purpose chat. People who write in for a code usually already have some interest in these topics.
We’re protecting the space, not excluding people: we don’t ask for real names or ID documents, only that you take a moment to write and briefly say what you’re interested in. If these themes matter to you, we welcome you to get in touch.

For how to request accounts and get started, see Community.

A word to people who use Discord¶

We don’t want this to feel like an either/or: many people need to stay on Discord for communities, games, or projects, and that’s fine. We’re saying: when you need to discuss sensitive topics or want higher privacy and a predictable environment, there is a small, stable Matrix space here.

If you want to dive into the 2026 themes (personal privacy guidelines, Tor Relay on campus, anonymous payments) or run experiments around anonymous networks, you’re welcome to do that on Matrix and Cryptpad.
If you only want to follow along occasionally, staying on your current platform is fine. We’ll keep sharing progress on the site and at events; you can decide later whether to go further.

anoni.net’s door stays open. The difference is that we think about this path in terms of who decides the rules and who holds the data, and we use a self-hosted Matrix and an application-based account process to balance privacy and quality in a way we can live with.

Project Proposal – g0v Hackath71n (g0v, the 71st Hackathon)

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

Project Proposal – g0v Hackath71n (g0v, the 71st Hackathon)¶

This time, we’re heading south to Kaohsiung (a.k.a. Takao) to participate in the “g0v Hackath71n – g0v the 71st Hackathon.” If you happen to be in southern Taiwan during this period, or if you’d like to travel south to Kaohsiung together—combining a short trip with a few days of remote work while joining the event—feel free to come find us at the hackathon. We’ve registered a booth to help move forward the progress of the “Anonymous Online Community” 2026 project!

At the moment, it looks like there are still a few spots available. If you’re interested in our project and would like to contribute, you’re very welcome to join us on the day of the event—no matter your background or area of expertise.

Time: January 25, 2026 (Sun) 10:30–17:30 (+0800)
Location: Le Phare Co-working Space | Xin Zuoying Branch / 4F, Global Mall, No. 1, Zhanqian North Road, Zuoying District, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan

Hackathon Goals¶

The January 25 hackathon will focus on advancing three project goals:

Personal Privacy Guidelines: How can we make practical adjustments to improve the security of our everyday internet usage? At present, we still lack a complete, actionable set of guidelines and materials.(Curriculum development)
Tor Relay Campus Deployment Competition: There is already a successful example at National Taiwan Normal University. To enable students at other universities to follow suit, we need a clear, well-documented process covering communication with schools, applications, and ongoing maintenance.(Event planning)
Anonymous Payments: As an essential piece of the “anonymity” puzzle, how anonymity can be achieved in everyday payment scenarios is a direction we plan to explore in greater depth.(Topic research)

Collaborative Notes¶

The shared notes document for this event can be found here!

Project Relaunch 2025

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

Project Relaunch 2025¶

Hello everyone, anoni.net Docs is set to reboot in 2025, with three sub-projects currently planned as the focus and goals for our 2025 research. If you are interested in this topic, consider joining us to explore, discuss, and work on issues related to "Internet Freedom".

This document site will also serve as a place for ongoing updates, event announcements, and the publication of research results. We recommend subscribing to the mailing list, as we will use it to send notifications about any new information updates.

Project Plan¶

The anoni.net Docs project currently comprises three sub-projects, covering data analysis, assisting with the maintenance and update of localized website testing lists, and promoting localization and document translation. Regardless of your background or location, if you are interested in the following sub-projects, you are welcome to participate! Below is a brief introduction to the sub-projects and the goals we aim to achieve.

ASN Autonomous System Network Observation Data Analysis¶

Building on the 2023 and 2024 research project "ASN Autonomous Network Observation Data Coverage," the report will continue investigating the relationship between ASN autonomous network systems and factors such as internet censorship and interference. Additionally, we will study ASN coverage in other regions to determine whether a lack of data diversity affects OONI's ability to interpret observation data.

We plan to establish a data pipeline architecture for automating the data collection and organization process during research, potentially allowing real-time presentation of results with OONI Data.

Learn more about this project

Data Pipeline Architecture

Possible but not limited approaches:

Use Airflow to visually organize the data processing workflow, focusing on data compilation and report generation.
Alternatively, a simple API-based method to provide data for front-end chart presentations or other back-end applications may be used.

OONI Website Testing List¶

The OONI Probe website testing relies on lists provided by various regions. The Taiwan list (tw.csv) hasn't been updated or reviewed since its last update in 2017. The websites on the list can affect the results of the observation program, so it is necessary to spend some time correcting and adjusting the current list, followed by identifying new sites for observation inclusion in 2025.

Learn more about this project

Current Status of the Testing List

No review or update since 2017, resulting in many sites no longer existent or URLs changed.
Many URLs starting with http have not been corrected to https.

Localization and Document Translation¶

OONI's services and tools are expanding, and ongoing localization will help maintain local terminology and usage. Additionally, we plan to translate key announcements and technical documents to lower the barriers for understanding and participation, hoping to attract more people to join the research and contribute.

Learn more about this project

How to Participate¶

This document site is established to attract more partners interested in topics like "internet freedom" and "content censorship" to join us. It aims to provide a starting point for participants with hands-on documents for reading or to complement the current project progress. The document site will serve as the project's gateway, and subscribing to the mailing list will help you stay updated. In the future, Github will be used for task assignments, working towards a collaborative approach to knowledge sharing.

Event Announcements¶

As RightsCon 2025 will be held in Taipei, many international project teams and communities will come to Taipei at the end of February to attend the event. We are fortunate to host a workshop and lecture event with the teams of Tor and OONI before the conference. The event is currently scheduled for the afternoon and evening of 2025/02/23. If you are interested in learning more about the Tor and OONI projects or wish to interact with project team members, please seize this opportunity!

How to Register?

Since the event registration process is still being prepared, you can first subscribe to the mailing list. Once the event location and registration methods are confirmed, a reminder notification will be sent via the project mailing list. Don't miss it!

Taipei Coffee and Circumvention Meetup 2025/10

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

Taipei Coffee and Circumvention Meetup 2025/10¶

Image credited to Taipei Coffee and Circumvention Meetup 2025/10 https://ocftw.kktix.cc/events/internetfreedom-oct2025

After presenting InterSecLab's report on data leakage related to the Great Firewall of China at the "Taipei Coffee and Circumvention Meetup 2025/10," there were many discussions during the latter part of the event. The questions centered around what actions we can ultimately take in the face of state-level surveillance methods and capabilities.

The previously provided cybersecurity recommendations also need to be revisited and revised. Below, we will review some of the topics discussed that day through text. We also recommend taking some time to read this report, as it will provide a clearer outline of the risks and challenges we are facing.

Abuse of Open Source Software¶

The report found that some software used in the Great Firewall is built upon or modified from existing open source software. This raises a concern: many engineers contribute to open source projects in their fields, only to see their work misused by certain organizations that completely disregard open source licensing guidelines. Although these guidelines may lack substantial enforcement power, when contributions are used for privacy surveillance, we currently lack measures to resist or respond. When the misuse of open-source software escalates to a national level, how can we balance and hold accountable such actions?

During the discussion that evening, we did not arrive at an answer. In the pursuit of internet freedom and democratic liberties, we may have to temporarily attribute this situation to the neutrality of tools, a scenario that resembles the use of Tor and onion networks.

WebTunnel, Which the Great Firewall Struggles to Effectively Block¶

The report mentions that while common VPN protocols can be identified and blocked, the Great Firewall currently cannot effectively block WebTunnel, a type of Tor bridge. Since the data leak occurred around December 2024, it remains uncertain whether, after 10 months, the Great Firewall's technology still cannot block it. Similarly, Snowflake, which disguises Tor connections through streaming, can also evade packet detection.

During the event that evening, we quickly introduced Snowflake to everyone. By using a browser extension, you can create a Tor bridge by establishing a stream similar to a video conference. This helps users in regions where Tor is completely inaccessible connect to the onion network through your bridge relay. For participants with technical capabilities, we also suggested setting up a bridge relay using the Tor-official WebTunnel (Docker image). This setup mimics browsing a website, thereby providing a bridge relay point.

Taking Action¶

During the evening discussion, we explored whether we should take "proactive" measures. Given the known surveillance and repressive actions by some authoritarian governments, should we actively seek to change the current situation? Of course, after the initial surge of emotions, we realized that the issues we face might not be as simple as correcting a code deployment error or rebooting a server. When factoring in the defense of human rights, we might be confronted with real-world dangers and threats to our lives. At that moment, a brief pause allowed participants to reflect on the risks and assess how determined we are to take action.

To slightly ease the heavy atmosphere of the topic, we shared InterSecLab's next steps. They aim to recruit partners interested in code analysis and research. The report mentioned that a significant portion of the leaked data remains unexplored and unanalyzed. Moreover, in the countries where the Great Firewall technology has been exported, an entity code-named A24 has yet to be identified. Perhaps efforts from various professional fields can become a powerful form of resistance against authoritarian regimes!

This is a quick recap of the "Taipei Coffee and Circumvention Meetup 2025/10" event. We also extend our gratitude to the Open Culture Foundation（開放文化基金會） for the invitation, providing the "Anonymous Network Community" an opportunity to share. If you haven’t read our translated report yet, you can access it here! We are also preparing to develop user-friendly defensive capabilities based on the report's findings, possibly starting with privacy protection. Interested individuals are welcome to join the discussion through this channel.

Of course, you can also email us directly!

Community Project Establishment - Anonymity Network Community

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

Community Project Establishment - Anonymity Network Community¶

We initially focused solely on observing and analyzing OONI data. Now, we are jointly promoting Tor/Tails anonymous network tools, deciding to use the topic of "anonymous networks" to continue advocating for "internet freedom" in Taiwan.

Thanks to this workshop event, we have been fortunate to gather partners from various backgrounds to join our community. We hope to maintain this diversity in the future, focusing on and providing diverse assistance to the people we serve.

Community Name: Anonymity Network Community
Community Website: https://anoni.net/

The original OONI-Research website will automatically redirect to https://anoni-net.ipns.dweb.link/. We plan to host a meeting after the "Anonymous Network Workshop" to discuss our visions for the community's future. If interested, you can continue to follow us or subscribe to our newsletter.

Thank you!

Review: Internet Freedom Workshop: Tor、Tails、OONI

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

Review: Internet Freedom Workshop: Tor、Tails、OONI¶

The Tor/Tails and OONI workshops successfully concluded on the afternoon and evening of February 23, 2025. Whether you participated in the entire event or not, we sincerely thank all the partners, volunteers, and the Tor and OONI teams for their involvement! To review the day's events, we have prepared a brief summary and the event presentation for your reference.

Event Agenda:

Workshop 14:00 – 17:30 Circumventing censorship and navigating anonymously with Tor
- Raya, Education Coordinator @ The Tor Project
- Gus, Community Team Lead @ The Tor Project
Workshop 18:00 – 19:00 Detecting and Measuring Internet Censorship with OONI
- Elizaveta Yachmeneva, Research & Community Coordinator @ OONI
- Maria Xynou, Director of Strategic Engagement @ OONI
Lecture 19:30 – 21:00 Tor: Defending your online privacy in a surveillance world
- Roger Dingledine, Co-founder of The Tor Project

Tor/Tails Workshop¶

Presentation Download (Google Slides)

Why You Need a Second Device¶

Due to budget constraints and user habits, personal and work tasks are often mixed on commonly used devices. Handling sensitive information for work and everyday personal use on the same device while neglecting cybersecurity measures can pose significant risks of data leakage. Therefore, using a second device for work or other critical tasks can be a better choice.

Commonly neglected cybersecurity threats include: malicious software or spyware that can exploit known or undisclosed vulnerabilities and malicious links to install tracking or backdoor control on the device.

What is Tails?¶

Tails is an operating system that can be installed on a USB stick to boot on laptops or desktop computers. Unlike regular operating systems, each startup provides a fresh and clean environment, which can be used offline. If you want to connect to the internet, it is mandatory to use Tor's onion routing for anonymous browsing.

The Tails project was initiated in 2009 and merged into a sub-project of the Tor Project in 2024, sharing development and community resources.

Although Tails provides a new environment at each startup, it also offers an encrypted storage space for convenience. This can be mounted at startup, allowing data to be accessed and edited, even after the environment is restored to its original state.

Tails includes many security-focused open-source software applications that are ready to use once you start Tails (useful in completely offline scenarios). Due to its security by design approach, some commonly used software may not be immediately available in Tails. The team is working to adjust or adopt other technologies to meet anonymity and incognito requirements.

Tails does have some limitations. It cannot be used on some newer Mac computers (primarily due to ARM processors), the Tor network can be slightly slow, and it does not currently support commonly used messaging software (WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal). Therefore, consider using Tails when you require strong protection in specific scenarios.

What is Tor?¶

Since Tails integrates the Tor Onion Routing, all connections are forced through Tor to connect to the internet. Before knowing about Tor, we might have used VPNs to browse the internet. However, unlike Tor, VPNs only encrypt the data during transmission. The VPN service provider knows who you are, where you connect from, and where you're connecting to. They can also potentially identify you through payment information used when purchasing the service.

Tor, on the other hand, uses three nodes (Tor Relays) and encrypts data three times, with each relay only knowing part of your information. Since Tor Relays are established by volunteers worldwide, their decentralized and diverse nature makes it difficult to piece together a complete picture of you, thereby achieving a connection framework built on Privacy by Design.

Tor Browser¶

The default browser in Tails is the Tor Browser, which focuses on blocking ads and tracking technologies. The Tor Browser doesn't make you invisible but instead makes you blend in with others by anonymizing your browsing activities among the vast data sets. The Tor Browser is based on Firefox and is an open-source software product.

Using Tails¶

Download and Install USB Stick

Due to network bandwidth constraints at the event venue, the steps for downloading the image and creating a Tails USB stick are skipped, and participants will use pre-installed USB sticks instead. Creating the USB stick is not difficult and you can refer to the installation guide on the official website.

In the second half of the Tor/Tails workshop, around 30 USB sticks will be available for participants to use on their own laptops after rebooting. The first challenge participants usually face is how to set their laptops to boot from a USB stick. Depending on the brand of the computer, pressing F2 or F12 upon startup will allow you to choose to boot from USB.

Content You Might Be Interested In

Tor Project and Tails Join Forces: https://blog.torproject.org/tor-tails-join-forces/
Arti Project, a project to reimplement Tor in the memory-safe Rust language.
Google Summer of Code 2025: https://blog.torproject.org/tor-in-google-summer-of-code-mentorship/`

OONI Workshop¶

Download Presentation (Google Slides)

OONI is a tool used to detect whether networks are subject to surveillance and censorship. In certain regions, network blockades using DNS or IP blocking methods result in some types of websites or services becoming inaccessible. By using OONI Probe to conduct tests and upload observation data in real-time, it is possible to map out the network blocking situation in the area.

This workshop demonstrated how to use OONI Run. Like OONI Probe, OONI Run is also a tool for detecting network conditions. The main difference is that OONI Run allows users to customize the list of websites to be tested and share it with anyone worldwide to assist with testing. Although OONI Probe has a predefined testing list, the process for updating and deploying it cannot be adjusted in real-time. OONI Run offers the flexibility to quickly test with a customizable list.

When creating a new list in OONI Run, users can also specify an associated number (Link ID), which allows them to quickly search for related test data on OONI Explorer and use simple charts to identify the current network conditions.

Content You Might Be Interested In

What is OONI?
OONI Run Link ID created on the event day is 10137. You can quickly understand the network situation through crowd-assisted testing.
Probe Security Without Identification, Michele Orrù, 2025-02-20: As OONI probes enhance network situation assessment, risks such as intentional or unintentional uploading of incorrect observation data by users could impact the credibility of OONI's observations. The article discusses how attackers may use fake data to pollute OONI's observation database to undermine platform trust, emphasizing transparency and exposing digital rights violations.
2024 OONI Review: https://ooni.org/post/2024-year-in-review/
Taiwan ASNs Overview in OONI Observational Data (2023/12)

Roger's Talk¶

Download Presentation (PDF)

This talk featured Roger, the founder of the Tor Project, sharing insights on the state of internet freedom and Tor's efforts in protecting user privacy. Below are the key points from the presentation.

Importance of Diversity: He emphasized that part of security comes from the diversity of online services and the diversity in how users access the internet. Roger explained that with tools like Tor, different people (such as regular users and political dissidents) can use online services on the same platform without making specific groups targets. Additionally, the diverse purposes of download (like accessing blocked websites) enable varied uses and provide a layer of protection against easy identification and attack of specific uses.
User Privacy Protection: Tor's goal is to let users decide who can access their data and communication metadata, preventing intentional collection and user identification.
Awareness of Technology Misuse: He discussed how technology can sometimes be misused or misunderstood, often due to stereotypes about the dark web presented in movies, highlighting the need to address and improve these perceptions.

Future Areas of Focus:

Privacy Regulations and Technological Advancements: Monitor changes in global privacy regulations and technological progress to understand how to protect individual online privacy.
Net Neutrality: Ensure that different types of content and technological applications can be freely accessed on the internet.
Education and Advocacy: Raise awareness among the public and policy makers about the importance of internet freedom and privacy protection.

Actions We Can Take:

Transformative actions include promoting the use of internet anonymity tools, educating users on personal privacy protection, and supporting or participating in related policy advocacy efforts to advance reasonable internet freedom policies.

Content You Might Be Interested In

During the talk, Roger also mentioned different ways to connect to Tor, with Snowflake allowing connections disguised as streaming to assist Tor users. Snowflake is the easiest and most convenient way to contribute bandwidth to Tor, requiring only the installation and activation of a browser extension.
Tor University Challenge - Electronic Frontier Foundation: Initiated by the EFF, the "Tor University Challenge" aims to encourage more universities to run Tor relays to enhance Tor network stability and resistance to censorship. The website provides various resources to assist university administrators and technical teams in setting up and managing Tor relays, supporting efforts for internet freedom and anti-censorship.

Future Plans

The anoni.net will continue promoting the use of Tor/Tails and OONI in Taiwan, working on issues of internet freedom and censorship. If you're interested in participating or want to continue receiving our updates, please refer to the "Stay Informed" section for how to join. We plan to hold Tor/Tails and OONI workshops at the COSCUP event in August 2025, conducted in Mandarin, with assistants to help participants (tentatively). Before the event, we will need to edit training materials, provide training, and make necessary preparations. If you are interested in participating in this event, please refer to the contact information in the "Stay Informed" section to let us know.

2025/03 Project Status and Updates

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

2025/03 Project Status and Updates¶

Time flies, and March is almost over! The first quarter of 2025 is also coming to an end. Let's review the current progress and some achievements of the project. In this update, we will mention the follow-up plans after the workshop, the OONI team's release of the implementation concept of 'anonymous credentials,' the current translation achievements of the project, and the establishment of the Tor Relays observation station!

After Workshop¶

RightsCon 2025 was successfully held in the last week of February. The day before the event, we organized a workshop with the Tor/Tails and OONI teams, attracting over 300 participants. It was somewhat surprising to have such a large number of registrations, and we appreciate the support from the Tor/Tails and OONI teams. We also thank the volunteers and other partners from the Open Culture Foundation for their support in assisting RightsCon, providing us with strong support despite the shortage of manpower.

After the event, we compiled a summary article and presentation collection from this workshop and lecture. Whether you participated on the day or wish to review the event's content, you can refer to the contents of this article.

Continuation of the Workshop¶

In this event, participants in the Tor/Tails and OONI workshop gained a preliminary understanding of issues related to 'internet freedom' and 'anonymous networks.' They also engaged in hands-on practice with tools to enhance their security and privacy defenses. After the event, we received valuable feedback and suggestions regarding the workshop arrangements. As a result, we have decided to apply for a workshop session at this year's COSCUP to continue promoting these topics, adjusting them to better align with Taiwan's local context and language.

COSCUP is scheduled to be held on August 9th and 10th at National Taiwan University of Science and Technology. We plan to host a workshop on one of those days. Before August, we need to adjust our presentations and materials to include content in Mandarin and Taiwanese terminology. Additionally, we need to start recruiting team members to prepare for the workshop and train workshop assistants. If you are interested in the workshop, please remember to contact us. We anticipate starting the preparations in the second week of April.

Anonymous Credentials¶

Recently, we translated an article from the OONI team that discusses their plans to improve and enhance the verification of anonymously submitted data. This includes ways to advance privacy and data credibility while combating the impact of malicious, false data submissions on the overall database. If you're interested, you can read the article.

The article provides a literature review of the relevant field and outlines the future implementation process of 'anonymous credentials' by the OONI team. The content is somewhat technical and might be challenging to read, but we highly recommend spending some time to understand it, or feel free to discuss and share your suggestions with us!

This concept might relate to the same field as the digital wallets recently promoted by the Ministry of Digital Affairs!

Translated Articles¶

In addition to the previously mentioned article about 'anonymous credentials,' we will also translate other significant articles released by Tor, Tails, and OONI. For example, did you know that Tor plans to implement using Rust? The project is named Arti. Tor was originally constructed using the C programming language, but C requires careful handling of memory operations, which, if not managed well, can lead to security issues. Therefore, they have decided to use Rust to develop a more secure Tor application. The Arti project is currently in the process of gradually implementing the functionalities of the C-based Tor. If you're interested, you can refer to this already translated article.

Additionally, we are currently translating a project website for the Tor University Challenge, a collaborative initiative by EFF and Tor. We hope to complete this translation by the end of March, and we will provide more detailed information at that time.

Tor Relays Observation Station¶

A Tor Relays observation station has been added to the project page. This page is primarily for observing the number and operational status of Tor Relays in Taiwan. The official Tor website provides a Tor Metrics query site, from which we retrieve recorded information hourly and transform it into easily readable charts. This helps create a more compelling narrative when promoting the project.

Currently, this page is still under development and testing, and we cannot guarantee it will operate 24/7 (we are working on solving stability issues XD). The development code has not yet been merged into the main branch. Interested partners can refer to the 'pulse' and 'api' branches, or you can freely experiment on the API documentation page. We are using Python's FastAPI and Pydantic as the development framework.

Of course, we are also looking for partners familiar with processing large volumes of data. If interested, please feel free to contact us directly!

Lastly¶

The above outlines the current progress of this project. We will continue to translate important articles, import observation data from Tor and OONI, and prepare for the workshop activities in August. We welcome you to keep following us or subscribe to updates from this page via RSS.

2025/05 Project Status and Updates

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

2025/05 Project Status and Updates¶

May 2025 has passed, and amidst all the ongoing events, we would like to share the progress of the project over the past month with you!

Anonymous Network Workshop (Preparation)¶

The "Anonymous Network Workshop" event, scheduled to take place at COSCUP in August 2025, had its first online planning meeting on May 18. You can refer to the meeting notes here. We appreciate the participation of many partners who have signed up for this event. The next meeting is scheduled for June 8, 2025, at 21:00 UTC+8, and is expected to cover topics such as training schedules, event preparation, and more.

The materials are currently being translated. We are adapting the Tor/Tails materials by simply translating them into Chinese without altering the original structure to make them suitable for a Chinese-speaking audience. There has been a robust response for training assistants, but we still need some volunteer partners for event assistance, such as promoting the event, managing the registration page, and planning the activities on the day of the event, among others. If you are still interested, feel free to sign up!

Staff Registration

The event is planned to be divided into two groups: the Activity Group and the Teaching Assistant Group. There is no restriction on joining only one group; participation depends on the time you can commit.

Open Source and Anonymous Network Roundtable¶

The proposed itinerary for the two event days.

This year at COSCUP, we have secured two days for our event, providing ample time for activities. We aim to include roundtable discussions to bring topics like the open source community, anonymous networks, and local community building to the forefront of the conference. We have roughly planned three major categories and six topics and are looking for suitable facilitators to help drive the discussions on these issues on the day. If you or someone you know would be a suitable candidate, please let us know. We would sincerely invite them to join the discussion. You can refer to the planning details on this page for more information on the discussions.

Intersection of Open-Source Technology and Anonymous Tools
- "The Open-Source foundation and Local Participation Possibilities of Tor/Tails/OONI"
- "From User to Contributor: How Taiwan Can Establish Community Nodes and Feedback Models for Tor/OONI"
Social Connection between Open-Source Spirit and Internet Freedom
- "Free Software and Digital Rights: Why Is Open Source Key to Anonymous Tools?"
- "How to Localize an Open-Source Anonymous Toolkit?"
Local Community and Collaborative Practices
- "Promoting a Decentralized, Open-Source Collaborative Anonymous Network Initiative"
- "Potential for Regional Open-Source Collaboration: Connecting with Other Anonymous Network Communities in Asia"

We are also conducting a poll on the discussion topics. If you have time, please help us by completing the survey!

COSCUP Open Source Topics

Since COSCUP primarily focuses on open source code and the open-source spirit, we aim to align our topic selections as closely as possible with the attributes of the conference.

Self-Skills Evaluation Form¶

We have completed a skills assessment form for Tor, Tails, and OONI, which allows participants to self-assess their familiarity with "anonymous networks." The assessment is divided into Basic L1 to L3 and Advanced L1 to L2. Currently, the basic sections include reference answers, but it is recommended to first explore the questions at each level independently. For parts you cannot find or are unsure about, you can refer to the suggestions we've provided.

Helpers in the workshop will be trained to reach Basic L3 level before the event, aiming to ensure they have the ability to answer questions or guide participants through activities during the event.

The Advanced section focuses more on hands-on activities, which we plan to complete by Q3 2025. Stay tuned!

Establishing an Anonymous Network Community?¶

Initially, we were curious about how many people in Taiwan are interested in the topic of "anonymous networks." After hosting the first online meeting, we discovered that many are either quite concerned about it or are already researching this topic regularly. The establishment of a community seems to resemble a call of, "Hey, we're talking about and doing the same things here!" which simply brought everyone together.

We are making efforts to set up or use anonymous services (Etherpad, Formbricks, Jitsi), and are attempting to create corresponding onion services (Project Documentation, Etherpad, Formbricks), consciously assisting partners in maintaining a degree of anonymity while participating in our events (we are still searching for a suitable calendar service, and evaluating whether to use Stalwart for email hosting).

Currently, after successfully holding the "Anonymous Network Workshop" in August, we hope to start considering what form a "community" can take and what services it can offer in Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific region, or the Indo-Pacific region, as well as how to participate in international affairs. We welcome everyone to provide us with feedback, even if it's in the form of requests XD.

With about two months left to prepare for the workshop event, this will be our busy period. Please continue to support us with the progress reported above. Thank you!

Domain Name Description

anoni.net and anoninetru5tflukgfaehun7q6khowgmymcff3gtk5oyesqazhmfxtyd.onion will be the domains used for establishing community tools in the future. Domains ending in .onion can only be accessed through the Tor browser.

Anonymous Network Workshop Progress Update

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

Anonymous Network Workshop Progress Update¶

We have made some progress and identified areas that require assistance in our "Anonymous Network Workshop" and projects recently, and I wanted to share this with you.

Anonymous Network Workshop (Preparation)¶

Last week, we held our second online meeting. With less than two months left until our August event, we have started dividing tasks among staff. We currently have two groups: the Event Team and the Publicity Team. We are using the remaining two months to prepare the event registration page and handle pre-event promotional activities. We are still recruiting staff members and welcome you to sign up and join us in organizing this workshop event.

Additionally, we've successfully completed the translation of the training presentation needed for the Tor/Tails workshop (thanks to all the partners involved in the translation, and special thanks to Gus and Zaatar from Tor/Tails). Our focus will now shift to training teaching assistants by the end of June. If you happen to have time, you're welcome to join us online. Before participating, you can refer to the self-assessment skills form to find possible answers. We will discuss and resolve them together during the online training sessions.

Here are the timings for the online training sessions. Please create calendar reminders for yourself. We will be using the same online meeting link each time. Join us whenever you are available! (Each session is expected to be 90 minutes long)

6/14 21:00 Tor L1 ~ L3
6/15 13:30 Tails L1 ~ L3
6/15 21:00 OONI L1 ~ L3
6/21 21:00 Tails L1 ~ L3
6/28 13:30 Tor L1 ~ L3
6/29 13:30 OONI L1 ~ L3

By the way, during our meeting last week, we discussed that the workshop requires a significant number of USB drives for participants to use on-site. As we currently do not have a process in place to accept monetary donations, we can accept material donations. If you happen to have spare USB drives available, we would greatly appreciate your contribution. We aim to collect 25 drives. The drives need to be capable of booting with Tails installed (approximately 1.6 GB).

Simplified Chinese Language Support¶

"Initiative" means you want to make things better, and then you start taking action, eventually bringing everyone together to focus on it and support it, making real change happen. The power of initiatives transcends language. Regardless of the script used, our desire for change is the same, which is why we provide a Simplified Chinese version (zh-CN), hoping to cross language barriers and attract more people to join!

We also observed that approximately 30% of search traffic comes from Simplified Chinese keywords, leading to our project page. This is quite an interesting phenomenon. So, aligning with regional needs, we offer suitable content!

For some content, we seek assistance from ChatGPT to modify and add the appropriate context, but we'll primarily base our explanations and discussions on a Taiwanese perspective. If you're interested in extending or developing relevant content in other languages, you're welcome to join our "Anonymous Network" initiative!

Of course, feel free to refer project content to any partners who might need it. Thank you!

Simplified Chinese Project: https://anoni-net.ipns.dweb.link/zh-cn/

Open Source and Anonymous Network Roundtable Conference¶

Planned schedule for the two-day event.

This time we're trying to organize a roundtable discussion format. We need to engage more with our target audience, such as civic groups, news media, independent journalists, and tech communities. If you know partners who are among our future service targets, please help us spread the word about this workshop event and the roundtable discussions. Detailed information can be found on the preparation page.

In Conclusion¶

The topic of the "Anonymous Network" continues to evolve along the lines of "Internet Freedom," with personal privacy and online behavior tracking (such as advertising) being ongoing challenges we face. This is not just about confronting these issues but also about raising public awareness on the importance of privacy. The "Anonymous Network" will encompass more facets in the future, whether it's garnering recognition for the topic or training on the infrastructure and tools of anonymous networks. We hope to gradually attract more participation.

Therefore, the workshop activities and roundtable discussions aim to incorporate your vision of the "Anonymous Network" to shape the future of the community!

Thank you for your attention!

2025/08 Project Update

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 09 May 2026 17:18:07 +0000

2025/08 Project Update¶

The workshop held from 8/9 to 8/10 was successfully completed. We are currently preparing for post-workshop discussions and reviews, and considering future directions for improvement. Whether or not you participated in the two-day event, we sincerely thank you for your continued attention to our activities.

Up next, we would like to share some updates with you for the period in August 2025.

Booth、Brochure¶

After the workshop event, we also participated in the conferences of HITCON and PyConTW. Although we did not apply for a booth, we created a brochure about 'Anonymous Networks.' This brochure includes an introduction to our community and explanations about Tor/Tails, OONI, internet freedom, and anonymous network topics. It also details which open-source software our community currently uses to build services. This brochure was available for attendees to pick up at the conference venue.

In the future, this brochure will only be available at in-person events, with a limited number printed each time. We will continually update it with new information. During the workshop, we provided each participant with a copy. Based on observations from this event, we found it helpful for participants to understand the community's message about 'anonymous networks and internet freedom.' For future conferences or community events of a similar nature, we will actively apply for a booth to continue promoting our message.

Translated Articles¶

In August 2025, we are continuing to update information from the official websites of Tor/Tails and OONI. A significant amount of content was published this month, and we aim to have the articles translated, proofread, and published within a week. However, if you have research needs, you could also focus directly on the information releases from the official websites.

Test 7.0~rc2（zh-TW, zh-CN） - 2025/08/29
OMG! Summary of the 3rd Open Measurement Gathering (OMG) Ask Me Anything (AMA) event（zh-TW, zh-CN）- 2025/08/29
Corruption and Control: How Turkmenistan turned internet censorship into a business（zh-TW, zh-CN） - 2025/08/30
New Release: Tails 6.18（zh-TW, zh-CN） - 2025/07/31

Additionally, we noticed that The MIT Press Reader published a pretty good article. After obtaining permission from The MIT Press, we translated it into Mandarin. In this translation, we not only focused on translating the content but also added annotations to supplement the historical context mentioned in the article.

The Secret History of Tor: How a Military Project Became a Lifeline for Privacy（zh-TW, zh-CN） - 2025/09/07

SearXNG¶

SearXNG is an open-source privacy-focused search engine designed to protect user privacy. It aggregates search results from various search sources without tracking users or collecting personal data. SearXNG can be self-hosted to enhance privacy protection and supports customizable settings, allowing users to choose their preferred search engines and filtering rules.

Given the limited number of servers available in Asia on the current public server list, we set up SearXNG a week ago and applied to become a public server. We have met the basic technical requirements and are now in a two-week observation period. We welcome assistance in testing during this observation period to verify the host's capability to handle everyday usage.

Tor WebTunnel¶

Tor Relay Types

WebTunnel is one type of Tor bridge that assists users in connecting to the Onion routing network when they can't directly access it. WebTunnel acts as a proxy server to relay connections. Since Tails 6.18 version, it also added support for connecting via WebTunnel bridges. Due to the critical role of bridge points, connection parameters are not readily available on the Tor official website and need to be requested directly.

Because of this, we cannot determine how many Tor WebTunnel bridges are currently established in Taiwan. If you are interested, you can refer to the "WebTunnel Docker setup" to create one, or if you already have a service set up with nginx, you can contribute a node by providing a path for the WebTunnel bridge connection—we greatly appreciate such contributions!

Of course, there is an even easier way to contribute a bridge point: by using a browser to set up a Tor Snowflake bridge!

Conclusion¶

The above outlines the current progress of our community's work. If you have any suggestions or feedback, please feel free to email us directly. Thank you!

Taiwan’s Virtual Asset Service Bill: What the Cabinet Approved (and What Happens Next)

Toomore Chiang — Sat, 02 May 2026 21:34:57 +0000

Taiwan’s Virtual Asset Service Bill: What the Cabinet Approved (and What Happens Next)¶

On 2 April 2026, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (the cabinet) approved the Financial Supervisory Commission’s draft Virtual Asset Service Act and sent it to the Legislative Yuan for review. If you follow crypto policy or stablecoins, this matters because Taiwan is moving from an anti–money laundering registration regime toward a licensing regime for service providers. This post is a status briefing that gathers the April 2026 cabinet move in one place for readers who mostly skip the Mandarin policy wires. It stays at the policy level. For legal questions, talk to a qualified professional in Taiwan.

After the cabinet, the bill is still a draft¶

The document that passed the cabinet is draft legislation. The next steps are committee review, party negotiations, and possible amendments on the floor. The law only binds the public after three readings, promulgation, and an announced effective date. Headlines about maximum prison terms describe draft criminal provisions aimed at fraud, manipulation, and unlicensed activity. Always check the final text after the legislature finishes.

What the published structure says¶

Official summary materials (as distributed with the cabinet decision) describe 56 articles, including:

General provisions: purpose, regulator, definitions, sandbox-style experiments, and international cooperation (Articles 1–5).
Virtual asset service providers: licensing, business scope, corporate form, capital, and conduct rules (Articles 6–28).
Industry association (Articles 29–33).
Stablecoins: issuance, reserves, and trading consent (Articles 34–41).
Supervision and enforcement: market-abuse prohibitions, inspections, and exit rules (Articles 42–46).
Penalties (Articles 47–54).
Transition from AML registration to licensing and commencement (Articles 55–56).

The draft explicitly frames a transition period for existing AML-registered VASPs and financial institutions already active in the space.

How “virtual assets” are framed¶

The draft spends real effort defining virtual assets and distinguishing NFTs and similar instruments from what the act treats as in-scope assets. Whether a token falls under the act depends on the statutory definition and case-by-case supervisory judgment. A colloquial label in a news article does not settle scope on its own.

Why stablecoins get their own chapter¶

Articles 34–41 address stablecoins (pegged arrangements, issuance, and interaction with trading platforms). That matters internationally because many jurisdictions are updating stablecoin rules alongside broader crypto frameworks. Taiwan’s draft reads best alongside its own central bank and banking law. Treat comparisons to the EU’s MiCA or U.S. federal bills as shorthand that still needs the local text.

Criminal penalties (draft text)¶

The following numbers come from the draft articles published with the cabinet package, as reproduced in official summary PDFs:

Article 47: Certain fraud or market manipulation offenses carry three to ten years of imprisonment and fines from NT$10 million to NT$200 million, with additional rules for self-reports and cooperation.
Article 48: Operating without required licenses (including certain stablecoin issuance scenarios) can carry up to seven years of imprisonment and fines up to NT$100 million, with corporate liability.

Other articles cover custody violations, false filings, and lighter offenses. Read the full text for complete elements of each crime.

Who speaks at public hearings¶

Outside Taiwan, readers often imagine NGO-led advocacy. In this policy area, Taiwan’s public record centers on government agencies (for example the FSC, Central Bank, and Ministry of Justice) and industry associations such as the Taiwan Virtual Asset Anti-Money Laundering Association and the National Virtual Asset Service Industry Association (names may appear in Mandarin in official records). Human-rights or consumer NGOs show up when they are on the Legislative Yuan hearing roster by name. When writing or reading coverage, treat trade associations as industry stakeholders. If a group is a trade body rather than a rights or consumer organization, say that plainly instead of calling it generic “civil society”.

Self-custody and ordinary users¶

The draft targets commercial service providers and stablecoin issuers that take customer assets or operate platforms under the statute’s definitions. Non-custodial wallets and routine on-chain transfers often sit outside that core line of business, though facts still matter at the margin. If you are unsure how an activity is classified, ask a qualified professional in Taiwan. This article stays at the pattern level so readers can orient coverage without a case memo.

Why the anoni.net community cares¶

We promote Tor, Tails, and OONI and think about payments and identity as privacy problems. Clearer VASP rules change how regulated exchanges and on-chain self-custody sit next to each other in practice. Understanding the bill’s progress helps communities discuss privacy, anti-fraud enforcement, and compliance with a shared vocabulary.

Primary sources¶

Executive Yuan: PDF of the draft Virtual Asset Service Act (search the cabinet news item dated 2 April 2026 for the attachment).
Legislative Yuan: ly.gov.tw for hearing schedules and verbatim records.
Secondary media: BlockTempo summary (useful context. Verify against the PDF).

If you have a direct link to a hearing roster or written comment that names additional organizations, we can update the stakeholder section to match the official record.

anoni.net Docs — Sinophone Asia-Pacific Networked Freedom Observatory

We surveyed all 336 OONI Run v2 links, and three of them drive 72% of all measurements

We surveyed all 336 OONI Run v2 links, and three of them drive 72% of all measurements¶

What we did¶

How big is the population: 337 links in two years¶

Usage is extremely concentrated, Gini 0.981¶

Where the measurements concentrate¶

Long-term observation comes from a continuously-running backend, list size barely matters¶

anoni.net's own coordinates: the community is its own controlled experiment¶

What it means for communities and OONI¶

Data and caveats¶

Related reading¶

How Unredacted Helps People in Censored Regions Reach the Open Internet

How Unredacted Helps People in Censored Regions Reach the Open Internet¶

What Unredacted runs¶

From the anoni.net community: a Taiwan vantage point¶

From the anoni.net community: GreenWare's feasibility for free-connectivity regions¶

What you can do¶

Related reading¶

After Iran's 80-day blackout, traffic surged through our community's Tor WebTunnel bridge

After Iran's 80-day blackout, traffic surged through our community's Tor WebTunnel bridge¶

More than 80 days offline¶

Traffic jumped once Iran reopened¶

Why WebTunnel¶

Run one from your region¶

Not just Iran¶

Related reading¶

Campus Tor Relay templates: proposal, SOP, and FAQ now published

Campus Tor Relay templates: proposal, SOP, and FAQ now published¶

The template kit¶

For readers outside Taiwan¶

Why Taiwan still needs more campus relays¶

NZ's original materials¶

Acknowledgements¶

Financial Companies as Censors: A Sinophone Asia-Pacific Reading of EFF's Transaction Denied

Financial Companies as Censors: A Sinophone Asia-Pacific Reading of EFF's Transaction Denied¶

What Reitman compiles: a decade-plus of financial censorship cases¶

From account blocks to platform content policy: a new chain of cases in 2025-2026¶

Taiwan as case study: PayPal's domestic shutdown, Stripe's continued closure¶

Sinophone Asia-Pacific: the same mechanisms with regionally specific outcomes¶

What the community wants to advance next¶

Related reading¶

onionoo MCP is now public: query the Tor relay network in plain language

onionoo MCP is now public: query the Tor relay network in plain language¶

Why wrap Onionoo at all¶

What you can ask¶

How to connect¶

For AI client users¶

For direct API users¶

Where this fits alongside our other observation tools¶

Contribute or report back¶

Related reading¶

MADLink (Mandarin Translation) is Live, with an Editorial Observation Page on Taiwan's Response

MADLink (Mandarin Translation) is Live, with an Editorial Observation Page on Taiwan's Response¶

What the report found¶

The Mandarin translation: reading path¶

What's new this round: the editorial observation page¶

Why we wrote this page¶

Acknowledgements and how to join¶

Further reading¶

CryptPad 2026.5.0: zh_Hant Lands as a Built-in Locale After Two and a Half Years Upstream

CryptPad 2026.5.0: zh_Hant Lands as a Built-in Locale After Two and a Half Years Upstream¶

What CryptPad is¶

Why the community self-hosts CryptPad¶

Two and a half years of upstream work, mapped to a timeline¶

A note on 正體 vs 繁體 — naming the script¶

Using cryptpad.anoni.net from a censored or restricted network¶

Getting started on cryptpad.anoni.net¶

Further reading¶

Setting Up a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University: A Practical Experience of Communicating with the University and Leaving Open Possibilities

Setting Up a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University: A Practical Experience of Communicating with the University and Leaving Open Possibilities¶

Preface: Why Talk About Anonymous Networks on Campus?¶

Why Set Up a Tor Relay at a University?¶

How Did He Talk to the University? The Key Wasn’t Persuasion, but Giving Them Something They Could Account For¶

The Administrative Process Is Truly a Hassle, but Not a Dead End¶

Student Organizations and Outreach: Helping Tor Step Out of Its Label on Campus¶

Practical Advice and Pitfalls for Others¶

Actionable Advice¶

Common Pitfalls¶

Conclusion¶